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Abstract 
Responsible investment is a movement to integrate environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) considerations in institutional investors’ investing activities. Despite the rapid growth 
of responsible investment in worldwide markets including China, there exists a prominent 
knowledge gap in how investors or their professional engagement service providers engage 
with Chinese investee companies to monitor and improve the companies’ ESG risk 
management and preparedness. In particular, little is known about how Chinese investees 
perceive ESG engagement. This thesis investigates how ESG engagement with Chinese 
investees is conducted, taking into account the investees’ perspectives on ESG issues. It has 
been observed that how engagement activities contribute to the level of collective sense-
making of ESG issues shared by engagement practitioners and Chinese investee companies is 
not as linear as literature has described. Moreover, Chinese investees in general display a 
relatively low awareness and limited understanding of ESG-related concepts, lack top-
management support in addressing ESG matters strategically, are mostly motivated by client 
demand and regulations to address ESG issues, and are financially backed by the state or 
wealthy family shareholders. The thesis suggests an alternative model to conceptualise ESG 
engagement and the generated collective sense-making. The model encompasses engagement 
practitioners’ underlying approach or aim of engagement, the alignment of engagement 
activities with the underlying aim, the consideration of the Chinese investees’ characteristics 
during the engagement process, and lastly Chinese investee companies’ proactiveness towards 
addressing ESG matters. Specific recommendations to engagement practitioners and other 
stakeholders to further improve ESG engagement are proposed, which will help increase the 
chance of successfully motivating Chinese investees to enhance their ESG performance and 
thus strengthen the overall business case for responsible investment. 
Keywords: Responsible investment, ESG engagement, investor relations, Chinese investee 
companies
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Executive Summary 
Responsible investment, a movement to integrate environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) considerations in institutional investors’ investment decisions, has gained much 
attention from inter-governmental organisations such as the United Nations, worldwide 
financial industry and non-governmental organizations over the past decade. From 2007 to 
2010, the number of US investment funds incorporating ESG factors showed an increase of 
90% from 260 to 493, while the total net assets of such funds rose by 182% from USD 202 
billion to USD 569 billion (SIFF, 2010). Meanwhile, the socially responsible investment 
market in Europe also expanded from EUR 2.7 trillion in 2007 to EUR 5 trillion in 2009 
(Eurosif, 2010). With the launch of the first Chinese responsible investment fund in 2008, 
China also sees a steady growth in responsible investing activities. 
Despite the fact that responsible investment has been growing steadily, there lacks a thorough 
understanding on how institutional investors or their professional engagement service 
providers conduct ESG engagement with Chinese investee companies. Engagement is one of 
the key processes for investors to monitor the investee companies’ ESG risks and 
preparedness and motivate them to achieve higher ESG performance along the way. Relevant 
studies have mostly focused on the role of the institutional investor in driving engagement, 
presenting examples of successful or failing engagement from the perspective of investor 
and/or professional engagement firms. Perspectives of Chinese investee companies have not 
been much explored in the literature. Industry insiders have also expressed that professional 
engagement firms in general lack investee companies’ feedback on ESG engagement. The lack 
of feedback is even more acute in emerging markets such as China because the differences 
between the investee and the engagement practitioners’ operational and cultural environments 
further challenge effective communications.   
This thesis investigates the missing informational feedback from the Chinese investee 
companies to engagement practitioners and addresses the knowledge gap on investees’ 
perspectives in the current responsible investment literature. This research elucidates how 
Chinese investee companies perceive engagement activities, what drives and hinders them to 
attain higher ESG standards based on the engagement advice, and finally how engagement 
practitioners can further improve their work. The knowledge established through this research 
will help strengthen the overall business case for responsible investment. 
As such, two research questions (RQs) with sub-questions have been developed: 
RQ1:  How do engagement practitioners interact with Chinese investee companies? 
 What are the common practices in the Chinese context? 
 Why do engagement practitioners opt for such practices? 
RQ2:  How do Chinese investee companies perceive the engagement services they have received? 
 What are the common engagement services received? 
 How do Chinese investee companies make sense of such services? 
 How do Chinese investee companies decide what they should do regarding 
such services? 
The thesis employs a combination of quantitative and qualitative data analysis. The former 
refers to two different sets of questionnaires for engagement practitioners identified based on 
desktop research and Chinese investee companies selected from the MSCI Emerging Markets 
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Index. Relevant questionnaire respondents were subsequently invited to semi-structured 
interviews to explore in depth their views on ESG engagement. To supplement the relatively 
low response rates of questionnaires by Chinese investee companies, additional academics and 
experts with China experience and Chinese branch offices of international companies were 
invited to provide their opinion on the topic. The author has also conducted participant 
observation through a one-month unpaid internship at a professional engagement service 
provider, GES Denmark, to observe and obtain hands-on experience on ESG engagment.  
Two theoretical concepts stemming from stakeholder theories and organisation studies have 
been combined into a synthesised analytical framework to guide the design of the 
questionnaires and interviews, and the subsequent data analysis. The first one is a normative 
inter-organisational sense-making categorisation method proposed by Zarbafi (2011), who 
argued that investors should advocate their stance on ESG issues and inquire into the 
investees’ perspectives to help both parties to make sense of corporate responsibility 
collectively. This would more likely generate positive changes in the investees’ ESG 
performance. The second one is a descriptive research method suggested by Margolis and 
Walsh (2003) for examining how a company decides on social initiatives while balancing out 
the financial considerations. Their research agenda provided a template to develop questions 
to expose how Chinese investee companies make decisions regarding engagement and ESG 
issues in general.  
Despite the fact that a very limited number of Chinese investee companies have responded to 
this research, the data collected has displayed some trends that were worth considering. The 
subsequent data analysis confirms the collective sense-making categorisation by Zarbafi (2011) 
that high-advocacy and high-inquiry activities classified as Shareholder Dialogue, such as face-
to-face meetings, teleconferences and company or site visits, are the most desired by both of 
the engagement practitioners and Chinese investee companies. These activities can create a 
relatively higher level of collective sense-making of ESG issues. At the same time, the thesis 
shows that other factors may also affect the level of collective sense-making. The first 
observation is that investees’ high level of proactiveness to addressing ESG issues may result 
in better collective sense-making, even when the initial engagement activity’s levels of 
advocacy and inquiry are not that balanced. The second factor is concerned with whether the 
engagement practitioners’ underlying approach to engagement and the means of engagement 
are aligned with an explicit aim to generate collective sense-making. An alignment is more 
likely to result in more desirable engagement outcomes.  
With reference to Margolis and Walsh (2003)’s research approach on organisational decision-
making, the thesis has found that Chinese investees in general have a relatively low awareness 
and limited understanding on ESG-related concepts and lack top-management support in 
addressing ESG matters strategically. Many are also backed financially by the state or wealthy 
family shareholders. The source of motivation to address ESG issues is primarily client 
demand and legal compliance. Understanding these characteristics shall help engagement 
practitioners execute engagement more effectively.  
Based on the above findings and analysis, the thesis suggests an alternative model that 
describes the key elements to maximise the level of collective sense-making of ESG issues 
shared by the engagement practitioners and Chinese investees, which will increase the chance 
of successfully motivating the investee companies to improve their ESG performance. The 
model requires the engagement practitioner to adjust their engagement approach to include a 
clear aim of generating collective sense-making with Chinese investees, align its engagement 
activities with the underlying aim and mindfully consider the characteristics displayed by 
Chinese investees during the engagement process. If the Chinese investee company being 
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engaged is highly proactive towards ESG matters, a higher level of collective sense-making 
will be generated. As the thesis’ findings can only reflect the views of limited number of 
Chinese investees surveyed and interviewed, more direct and quality feedback from Chinese 
investees is needed to produce more generalisable and conclusive results.  
Specific recommendations for engagement practitioners and Chinese investee companies to 
enhance the level of collective sense-making of ESG issues are summarised below and more 
recommendations for policymakers and academics can be found in Chapter 6: 
Engagement Practitioners 
 Understand the importance of making sense of ESG issues collectively with Chinese 
investee companies; adopt an approach to engagement that aims to generate such 
collective sense-making; 
 Align engagement tools and activities with the above mentioned approach to 
engagement;   
 Prioritise resources to utilise Shareholder Dialogue as the primary engagement tool, 
for example face-to-face meetings, company or site visits and teleconference, to 
maximise collective sense-making with Chinese investee companies; 
 Avoid using questionnaires as the primary tool to access and analyse investee 
companies’ ESG information but rely more on publicly available data or well-
established third-party databases (e.g. Carbon Disclosure Project); at the same time 
encourage Chinese investee companies to disclose their non-financial data; 
 Join hands with other engagement practitioners to conduct collaborative engagement 
with Chinese investee companies, especially those with the state or families as the 
majority shareholder, in order to help them understand the ESG implications of their 
operations; 
 Manage engagement as an ongoing process to build trust with Chinese investees and 
try to engage with the top management for both of negative and positive ESG 
development to avoid the possible misconception that engagement practitioners are 
only an ‘ESG cop’ without genuine interests in the investees, and; 
 Raise awareness of Chinese investee companies, particularly the top and senior 
management, on ESG-related concepts focusing on how sound ESG management is a 
business case of its own that creates added values to the investees. 
Chinese Investee Companies 
 Disclose the company’s sustainability information properly to reduce the likelihood for 
engagement practitioners to use specially-designed questionnaire or other inquiry tools 
to gather basic ESG data, so that both of the investees and engagement practitioners 
can allocate more of their time and resources on Shareholder Dialogue such as 
meetings that are more effective in producing a higher level of collective sense-
making; 
 Ensure the contact information posted on websites are functional and maintained by 
dedicated personnel properly to facilitate meaningful contacts with potential 
engagement practitioners, and; 
 Be a learning organisation to continuously strive for a better understanding of 
responsible investment and ESG issues, which will give the Chinese investees an edge 
over others in an era when responsible investing activities are fast expanding. 
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1 Introduction 
Responsible investment, a movement to integrate environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
values in institutional investors’ investment decisions, has gained much attention from inter-
governmental organisations such as the United Nations, worldwide financial industry and 
non-governmental organizations over the past decade (Welker & Wood, 2011). From 2007 to 
2010, the number of US investment funds incorporating ESG issues showed an increase of 
90% from 260 to 493, while the total net assets of such funds rose by 182% from USD 202 
billion to USD 569 billion (SIFF, 2010). Meanwhile, the socially responsible investment 
market in Europe has also expanded from EUR 2.7 trillion in 2007 to EUR 5 trillion in 2009 
(Eurosif, 2010).  
The emergence of responsible investment corresponds with society’s growing concern for 
corporate social responsibility and offers a new perspective for investors to go beyond their 
traditional fiduciary roles to become an active agent to influence the production of public 
good. Against this backdrop, a new type of industry, namely company engagement firms, 
emerged. Hired by institutional investors to “monitor corporate behaviour and seek changes 
through dialogue with (investee) companies or through the use of share ownership rights, such 
as filing shareholder resolutions”, many of such engagement firms seek to drive the ESG 
performance of the investee companies (AICD, 2011).  
In recent years responsible investment has started to penetrate into the so-called “emerging 
markets”, a term first used by the International Financial Corporation in 1981 to describe the 
less developed countries that experienced rapid economic growth (IFC, 2013). These markets 
presented tremendous financial opportunities to both domestic and foreign investors. China 
has been one of foci among the emerging markets (EMDP & EIRIS, 2009). However, 
compared to other popular emerging markets such as Brazil, Russia and India, China’s 
performance on various ESG indicators often lagged behind the others (BSR, 2009). In 
particular, governance, business ethics and corruption were the top concerns for most 
responsible investors (BSR, 2009; EMDP & EIRIS, 2009). Engagement with specific 
reference to the local context was deemed as one of the crucial ways to address these ESG 
issues (Sustainalytics, 2012a, 2012b).  
While there is growing consensus on what responsible investment means in the international 
community, as shown in the UN backed Principles for Responsible Investment with 1155 
signatories as of 31 January (to be further discussed in Chapter 2) (UNPRI, 2013b), there has 
been limited research on how companies being invested in perceive and react to ESG 
engagement, let alone studies focusing on the emerging market. This thesis investigates how 
engagement is conducted by engagement practitioners with Chinese investee companies, and 
in particular, explores the investees’ perception of such activities and what drives them to 
adopt ESG advices or not. Such findings will help narrow the knowledge gap in responsible 
investment and shed light on how one can further improve engagement services, and thus 
strengthen the overall business case for responsible investment. 
1.1 Problem definition & Research Aim 
Based on an informal meeting with an engagement practitioner and preliminary literature 
review (ESP1, personal communications, 21 November, 2012; Waygood, 2006), the basic 
relationships between the responsible institutional investor, the engagement firm and the 
investee company within the environmental, social and political-economic contexts are 
presented in Figure 1-1. The solid black arrows are the money flows while the grey ones are 
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service flows. As a responsible shareholder of an investee company, the investor hires the 
engagement firm as a consultant to continuously monitor the investee company’s exposure to 
and preparedness for ESG risks. ‘Engagement Services 1’ refers to the engagement firm’s 
work report to its client, i.e. the investor, on the kind of ‘Engagement Services 2’ it has 
conducted with the investee company. Unlike the conventional relationship between a service 
provider and a client, in which the former receives a service order and a fee from the latter, 
the investee company has not explicitly requested services from and does not have any 
monetary relationships with the engagement firm in this case. The fact that the investee is the 
mere receiver of services makes it a “pseudo-client” to the engagement firm. 
 
Figure 1-1 Responsible investment operating within the environmental, social and political-economic contexts 
Having received engagement services that are not initiated by it but as a pseudo-client for free, 
the investee company does not normally have any motivation to provide feedback on the 
engagement firm’s quality of work. Such feedback is, however, commonly seen in a normal 
client relationship involving monetary exchange. For instance, if the quality of a certain 
product or service does not match with a client’s (the payer’s) expectation, it is likely that he or 
she will lodge a complaint against the product/service provider. This facilitates an 
informational flow back to the provider so that remedy and future improvements can be made 
accordingly. At the same time the engagement firm is not in the position to request feedback 
from the investee company either because its integrity and professionalism, as perceived by 
the institutional investor or the ‘real client’ who pays for the services, is built on its ability to 
provide engagement services based on objective research and analysis (ESP1, personal 
communications, 21 November, 2012). Neutrality and independence are thus of paramount 
importance to the engagement firm. The pseudo-client relationship between the investee and 
engagement firm therefore leads to a missing information flow (see black-dotted arrow in 
Figure 1-1) to inform the engagement practitioner its impact of work and hence making it very 
difficult to find out what may drive and hinder the investee to achieve better ESG standards. 
The lack of feedback is even more acute in emerging markets such as China because the 
differences between the investee and the engagement firm’s operational and cultural 
environments further challenge effective communications. 
Although engagement continues to be seen as an essential tool to enhance investee 
companies’ ESG performance, existing literature by inter-governmental bodies and industry 
practitioners mostly focuses on the role of the institutional investor in driving engagement and 
presents examples of successful or failing engagement from the perspective of investor and/or 
engagement firms. Notable examples are Principles 2 and 3 from the United Nations backed 
Principles for Responsible Investment (see Appendix 1) and various case studies in numerous 
industry reports (BSR, 2009; DMEBA, 2011; Sustainalytics, 2012a, 2012b). Perspectives and 
views of investee companies are almost non-existent. As Zarbafi (2011) pointed out, investors 
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need to learn how to balance between advocating their own principles (e.g. ESG 
considerations) and inquiring into those held by the investees. It is through the processes of 
social interactions, communications and negotiations that one will have a better chance of 
generating a collective view on these issues together. By making sense of ESG matters 
collectively, it is more likely to induce favourable behavioural changes in the investees.  
Therefore this thesis intends to explore the missing informational flow from the Chinese 
investee companies back to the engagement firms and address the knowledge gap on 
investees’ perspectives in the current responsible investment literature. The end result of the 
thesis is a deeper understanding of how Chinese investee companies perceive engagement 
services; what drives and hinders them to attain better ESG standards based on the 
engagement advice; and finally how engagement firms can further improve their services in 
the long run. This shall help strengthen the overall business case for responsible investment. 
1.2 Research question 
With the aforementioned problem definition and research aim, two research questions (RQs) 
with sub-questions are developed: 
RQ1:  How do engagement practitioners interact with Chinese investee companies? 
 What are the common practices in the Chinese context? 
 Why do engagement practitioners opt for such practices? 
RQ2:  How do Chinese investee companies perceive the engagement services they have received? 
 What are the common engagement services received? 
 How do Chinese investee companies make sense of such services? 
 How do Chinese investee companies decide what they should do regarding 
such services? 
RQ1 aims to expose how engagement practitioners initiate and implement the engagement 
process. More importantly, it explores the reasons behind their current practices. RQ2 puts 
the limelight on the Chinese investee companies and investigate their perspective on 
experience with ESG engagement. It aims to provide data on the sense-making process of 
Chinese investee companies when receiving engagement services.  
1.3 Method 
The thesis employs a combination of quantitative and qualitative data analysis. The former 
refers to two different sets of questionnaires sent to engagement firms based on desktop 
research and 117 Chinese investee companies selected from the MSCI Emerging Markets 
Index (MSCI EMI). More detailed explanation on the scope of the selected companies is 
discussed under Section 1.4. The thesis originally intended to invite relevant engagement 
practitioners and Chinese investee companies who had filled out the questionnaires to a semi-
structured interview to explore in depth their experience of engagement and how they made 
sense of it. Such qualitative data would supplement the overview of ESG engagement in the 
Chinese context collected in the questionnaires. However due to the extremely low 
questionnaire response rates by Chinese investees, the thesis adopted an alternative data 
collection plan to also invite academics and other industry experts to provide perspectives on 
the topic. Detailed discussion of the alternative plan can be found in Section 3.2. In addition a 
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one-month unpaid internship was also conducted at GES Denmark, an engagement firm 
headquartered in Sweden, to provide the author with hands-on experience in ESG 
engagement.   
Two theoretical concepts stemming from stakeholder theories and organisation studies were 
combined into an analytical framework to guide the design of the questionnaires and 
interviews and the subsequent data analysis. The first one was a normative inter-organisational 
sense-making categorisation method proposed by Zarbafi (2011), which explored how 
different types of sense-making could be achieved collectively by the institutional investors 
and investee companies. Zarbafi argued that the collective sense-making was a key factor 
contributing to positive changes in the investees’ ESG performance. The second one was a 
descriptive research method suggested by Margolis and Walsh (2003) to examine how a 
company decided on social initiatives while balancing out the financial considerations. Their 
research approach provided a template to develop questions to look into how Chinese 
investee companies made decisions regarding engagement and ESG issues in general. Both 
frameworks were combined into a synthesised one to guide the primary data collection and 
analysis, which will be discussed in detail in section 3.1. 
Apart from the above primary data collection methods, secondary information sources were 
also employed. As responsible investment is a financial practice, it is no surprise that a lot of 
the literature on the topic is indeed produced by industry practitioners and 
governmental/intergovernmental bodies that try to promote it. While the level of academic 
rigor of such research reports may not be directly comparable to formal academic literature 
(e.g. papers in peer-reviewed journals), they do provide valuable information on how 
responsible investment is practiced from an insider perspective. The thesis has therefore used 
both academic and industry literature where deemed appropriate. 
1.4 Limitation and scope 
It was expected that the response rates of questionnaires and interviews would play a key role 
in determining the amount and quality of data collected for further analysis. As reflected by 
other field researchers, conducting surveys related to responsible investment or ESG issues 
with Chinese investee companies was particularly challenging as these concepts were relatively 
new to them and there were cultural differences on how survey should be done (BSR, 2009). 
The thesis has therefore taken the lessons learnt from previous research projects into 
consideration but was aware that low response rate was generally observed in China, and that 
the quality of the subsequent analysis would be limited by this factor. 
In terms of scope, as mentioned in the Section 1.3, 117 Chinese investee companies in the 
MSCI EMI were included in the studies. These companies represented a total market 
capitalisation of USD 169 million (or EUR 132 million; as of February 2013) and respectable 
trading volumes. While sound financial performance was the primary consideration in 
responsible investment, as will be further explained in Chapter 2, it was hypothesised that 
companies with strong financial return would more likely to attract responsible investors and 
therefore receive some form of engagement services. Moreover, unlike some studies on 
responsible investment in China that focused on securities denominated in the Chinese 
currency of renmenbi (or RMB) and listed in mainland China only (such as BSR, 2009), Chinese 
stocks listed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (hereafter Hong Kong) were 
also included in this thesis because the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is a free market opened 
to international investors. Foreign investment in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
are regulated and up to this date they represent only a small fraction of the total stock market 
(BSR, 2009). As responsible investment is a relatively new concept in China but is much more 
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popular among international investors such as those from Europe and North America 
(EMDP & EIRIS, 2009; Guo, 2012), it is only logical to also include the Hong Kong stocks, 
which can be traded freely by both domestic and foreign investors. As for the engagement 
firms, key players in the Chinese markets were identified through the review of various 
industry research publications as well as the list of signatories of the UN Principles for 
Responsible Investment.  
While the thesis focuses on exploring interactions between the engagement firms and the 
Chinese investee companies and how ESG performance of the latter can be encouraged 
through improved engagement services, it does not intend to examine the correlation between 
responsible investing strategies and financial return. Such a correlation remains a debate not 
only in the academia but also the investment sector (Guo, 2012; Margolis & Elfenbein, 2008). 
Within the Chinese context, certain types of responsible investments such as the Industrial 
Social Responsibility Fund launched by Aegon Industrial Fund Management recorded 
exceptional performance compared to conventional investment funds (BSR, 2009). Further 
research will be needed to investigate if these cases were independent incidents or if they were 
supported by sound ESG management and practice of responsible investment. Although 
these further studies go beyond the scope of this thesis, what can be gathered from existing 
studies is that efforts to improve ESG have not shown detrimental effect on a company’s 
financial performance (DMEBA, 2011). 
1.5 Audience 
The thesis aims to enhance the understanding of the interactions between Chinese investee 
companies and engagement practitioners, as well as to address the general knowledge gap on 
investees’ perspectives in the current responsible investment literature. As such the primary 
audience of the thesis is engagement practitioners and Chinese investee companies. Other 
organisations that strive to promote responsible investment, for example, 
national/international networks of responsible investors (e.g. the United States Social 
Investment Forum, the European Social Investment Forum) and inter-governmental 
organization such as the United Nations Environmental Programme Financial Initiative and 
the Principles for Responsible Investment will also find the thesis relevant to their work. The 
findings, analysis and recommendations concluded by the thesis will help these stakeholders in 
responsible investment to improve their engagement strategy and approach, and hence 
achieve a higher chance to successfully motivate investee companies to raise their ESG 
standards. 
To a lesser extent, policymakers and government agencies may also find the thesis findings 
useful in terms of understanding the challenges and opportunities in engaging with investee 
companies in China. This may provide data for them to adjust existing policies to further 
encourage responsible investment. For example, countries like Denmark and Norway have 
national action plans for sustainable development, under which responsible investment is a 
major focus. 
1.6 Disposition 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis’ research problem, corresponding research questions, research 
method, limitations and scope of the current research as well as the target audience.  
In Chapter 2, the thesis research’s background information will be presented. This includes 
the definition and historical development of the concept ‘responsible investment’, the 
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involved key actors and operational processes, as well as the current situation of responsible 
investment in China. 
Chapter 3 presents the analytical framework employed by the thesis, which is comprised of a 
normative approach to examine how to successfully motivate investees to improve their ESG 
performance through collective sense-making and a descriptive research approach on how 
companies decide on social initiatives. These two concepts are translated into the context of 
responsible investment and merged to form a synthesised analytical framework to guide the 
data collection and subsequent analysis. This Chapter also elaborates the research 
methodology in details. 
Chapter 4 presents the data collected in literature review, questionnaires and interviews, with 
reference to the research questions. 
Chapter 5 turns to the analysis of the collected data based on the selected analytical 
framework. It also reflects on how the chosen research methodology has impacted the 
findings and subsequent analysis and the extent, to which the results are generalisable. 
Chapter 6 concludes the key findings of this thesis and provides recommendations to 
engagement practitioners and Chinese investee companies to maximise engagement impact. 
Policymakers and academics are also advised on what they can do to promote ESG 
engagement in the Chinese context. 
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2 About Responsible Investment 
The United Nations backed Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) defined 
responsible investment as: 
 
‘an approach to investment that explicitly acknowledges the relevance to the investor of 
environmental, social and governance factors, and of the long-term health and stability of the 
market as a whole. It recognises that the generation of long-term sustainable returns is 
dependent on stable, well-functioning and well governed social, environmental and economic 
systems’ (UNPRI, 2013a). 
 
The UNPRI is an initiative jointly undertaken by the United Nations Environmental 
Programme Financial Initiative (UNEP FI), the United Nations Global Compact and some of 
the largest institutional investors in 2006 (DMEBA, 2011). It is a set of six principles centred 
on the abovementioned definition and is open to practitioners’ signatory to promote 
responsible investment worldwide. For a detailed list of the principles, please see Appendix 1. 
UNPRI’s emphasis on considering environmental, social and governance (ESG) matters over 
a long investment horizon implies that institutional investors are expected to integrate ESG 
considerations at the beginning of the investment and to be an active owner to constantly 
monitor the ESG issues throughout the investment process. This chapter will provide an 
overview of the historical roots of the concept of responsible investment and how it has been 
shaped by various theories over time. Moreover, key actors and operational processes of 
responsible investment are also explained. Finally, an overview of the current situation of 
responsible investment in China is provided.  
2.1 Historical Development 
The integration of non-financial values such as moral and ethical standards into investment 
found its roots in some of the world’s oldest religions, for example Judaism, Christianity and 
Muslim (Renneboog, Horst & Zhang, 2008). For instance, some churches in the US and the 
UK tried to avoid investment in relation to weapons and slavery back in the 17th century. Such 
an investment approach that was based on an individual or a specific group of peoples’ ethical 
standards started to gain momentum in the 1960s and 1970s, when shareholders were inspired 
by the civil right movement in the United States and grew more and more concerned about 
how their investment might fuel the problem of apartheid in South Africa or the Vietnam War 
(Welker & Wood, 2011; Zarbafi, 2011). To answer the changing shareholder demands, the 
industry of socially-responsible investment emerged, trying to formalise investing strategies 
and methods that incorporate social and ethical concerns.  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a series of environmental disasters and corporate scandals 
such as the explosion at Chernobyl and bankruptcy of Enron Corporation brought investors 
to see a wider spectrum of risks that could be associated with investments (Zarbafi, 2011). 
Businesses’ environmental impacts and corporate governance standards, together with their 
social impacts (commonly referred to as environmental, social and governance or ESG 
considerations), received more attention in investment decisions. This formed the basis of 
what is now seen as responsible investment.  
Around the same period of time, new concepts about the role of institutional investors and 
how corporate management should be executed added new perspectives to investment 
practices. Monks and Minow (1995) argued that institutional investors became so big and 
diversified in terms of the assets and portfolios they managed that they were essentially 
‘universal and permanent shareholders’, owning a part of the whole economy. This concept of 
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universal ownership highlighted the fact that institutional investors were in a unique position 
in the economy and had a stake to advance not only their financial return, but also the 
potential social and public good in the long term. The key motivation was that, as their 
portfolio was so diverse covering different sectors in different geographical regions, the 
negative social and environmental externalities of one of their investee companies would likely 
be borne by another investee company within the portfolio (Kiernan, 2007; UNPRI & UNEP 
FI, 2011; Urwin, 2011). Figure 2-1 illustrates the relations between two investee companies 
within the same portfolio of an institutional investor. According to economic theories, market 
failure is at the heart of the problem of externalities. It induces inefficient allocation of 
resources, which then becomes damage costs to the economy, in other words negative 
externalities. In the figure, the sample external costs of the fictional portfolio Company A are 
pollution and ecosystem degradation, which are expressed in terms of rising health and 
resource costs. Such costs, which are external to and therefore not paid by Company A, may 
become actual input and operating costs of Company B, which happens to be in the same 
portfolio of an institutional investor. As such, the institutional investor or the universal owner 
of these two portfolio companies will have to face the consequences of the externalities 
sooner or later. Therefore, from the point of view of risk management, it will be in the 
institutional investor’s best long-term interest to encourage its investee companies to address 
their own ESG-related risks properly at their firm level. How this can be achieved will be 
discussed in Section 2.3. 
 
Figure 2-1 Example of how externalities created by market failure are transferred from company A to B 
within the same investment portfolio managed by the same institutional investor 
Source: Adapted from UNPRI & UNEP FI (2011)  
Furthermore, the rise of stakeholder theory in the 1980s challenged the conventional view that 
corporate management should solely be guided by the goal of profit maximisation, an idea 
popularized by Friedman (1970). Freeman (1984) advocated companies to move beyond the 
perspective of maximising shareholder value to adapt to the fast changing external 
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environment, in particular, the emergence of new stakeholder groups such as media and non-
governmental organisations. Following this logic, institutional investors are demanded not 
only to pursue shareholder value but to take stakeholders’ concern e.g. environmental impact, 
human rights, employee relations, into investment decisions.  
 
All of the above ideas formed the basis of the current understanding of responsible 
investment. In other words, responsible investment integrates ESG factors in relevant 
investment analysis and portfolio selection processes, and calls for the exercise of active 
ownership by investors to influence the investee companies’ ESG performance in the long run 
(DMEBA, 2011; Sullivan & Mackenzie, 2006; Urwin, 2011; Zarbafi, 2011). How active 
ownership can be executed will be further explained in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 below. 
2.2 Key Actors 
2.2.1 Institutional Investors 
In the simplest words, institutional investors are financial institutions acting on behalf of the 
people who have invested their savings and capital in various financial products, for example 
pension funds and other types of investment funds (Sullivan & Mackenzie, 2006; Zarbafi, 
2011). They are thus the intermediaries between their clients (the actual asset owners) and the 
investee companies, bearing a fiduciary obligation to their clients. Major institutional investors 
are pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies and banks. Among them, the pension 
funds are of particular relevance to responsible investment because of their long-term 
investment horizon. Such funds match well with the argument that responsible investment, 
which actively addresses and mitigates both short and long-term ESG risks, is more 
competitive than conventional investment in the long run. As mentioned before, institutional 
investors have come to be known as the ‘universal owners’ because of their sheer size and 
high degree of diversification of investment portfolios. For instance, such investors in the US 
‘held 73% of the 1,000 largest US companies at the end of 2009’ (CB, 2010). Asset managers 
are usually external personnel hired by the institutional investors to attend to the daily 
investment operations and portfolio management. In some cases, institutional investors may 
have in-house asset managers. 
2.2.2 Investee Companies 
Investee companies are basically any commercial organisations that are invested by 
institutional investors. Most of the investee companies in the market of responsible 
investment are publicly listed corporations, whose shares are traded by individual and 
institutional investors in the stock market. While responsible investment is also present in 
private equity and property investment, investee companies in this thesis refer to the listed 
corporations. Many of these companies practice the ‘separation of ownership and control’ 
(Zarbafi, 2011), meaning shareholding and day-to-day corporate management are separated. 
This gives the investee company much flexibility in hiring the most suitable professionals to 
manage the firm in the best interests of its shareholders. The annual general meeting is the 
official channel for individual and institutional shareholders to meet with the management, 
learn about the performance of the company, raise questions regarding certain practices, vote 
for relevant resolutions etc. Very often presentations and meetings are also regularly arranged 
by the investee companies for the institutional investors, since they may have more specific 
and technical questions on the performance of the company. As a listed company, its 
operations, such as how financial information is communicated to the public, are governed by 
relevant listing regulations in respective countries. 
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2.2.3 Engagement Firms 
Engagement firms are professional services providers in the responsible investment market. 
They are hired by institutional investors to ‘monitor corporate behaviour and seek changes 
through dialogue with (investee) companies or through the use of share ownership rights’ 
(AICD, 2011). They are therefore intermediaries between the investor and the investee. The 
goal of engagement firms is to help investors fulfil their role as active owners who shall 
proactively and effectively integrate ESG considerations in investment by engaging with the 
investee companies and driving their ESG performance. Common engagement efforts are 
one-to-one meetings, industry surveys, filing shareholder resolutions etc. (Zarbafi, 2011). In 
general, these efforts can be categorized into (1) private, (2) public and (3) collaborative 
(DMEBA, 2011). Some firms prefer the confidential, or so-called “behind-the-door” (private) 
approach as it enhances trust-building with the investee companies. In some cases, numerous 
investors pool their resources together to exert collaborative influence on the investee on the 
concerned ESG issue (DMEBA, 2011).  
It is generally agreed that Principle 2 of the aforementioned UNPRI describes the current 
understanding of engagement, which calls investors to be ‘active owners and incorporate ESG 
issues into [their] ownership policies and practices’ (UNPRI, 2006). Professional ESG service 
providers and advisories, however, may vary in defining what engagement is. An industry 
insider pointed out that some engagement firms would consider the more passive forms of 
communication to be engagement as well, for example pure questionnaire to collect ESG data 
from investees (ESP1, personal communications, 21 November, 2012). He held the view that 
engagement should have a clear goal of motivating investee companies to better address their 
ESG risks. It should also be highlighted that although engagement is usually conducted by 
professional firms and advisories, it is sometimes carried out by the institutional investors 
themselves. A survey of 25 institutional investors in Denmark in 2012 revealed that less than 
10% of their engagement works were accomplished by in-house personnel (Dansif, 2012).  
2.3 Investment Processes 
Responsible investment is done through numerous stages of research and analysis. Based on 
various literature, a flow chart of how the processes work is presented in Figure 2-2 below 
(DMEBA, 2011; Sullivan & Mackenzie, 2006; Zarbafi, 2011). The first stage describes the 
available investment universe, which is the total number of stocks available to the institutional 
investors. In the second stage, the investor conducts positive and/or negative screenings to 
include and/or exclude certain stocks to create the investment universe. Positive screenings 
refers to the selection of companies with products and services that can provide 
social/environmental good and/or companies with the ‘best-in-class’ ESG performance 
within the concerned industry. Negative screening is the process of excluding undesirable 
companies based on ESG considerations. Next, enhanced analysis is carried out to quantify 
the ESG factors and integrate them into the conventional financial analysis. The outcome of 
this stage is the qualified universe, i.e. companies with the most desirable financial and ESG 
performance. Finally, stocks that form the optimal mix for the investment fund will be chosen 
to create the selected portfolio, which are essentially the investee companies. While the above 
describes the general steps to select investee companies in responsible investment, an industry 
insider observed that some investors would first acquire shares based on pure financial 
analysis and then try to engage with the investee companies or adjust their portfolio using 
ESG parameters afterwards (ESP1, personal communications, 21 November, 2012). 
Depending on the situation, institutional investors may take up the engagement work 
themselves, or hire engagement firms to provide such services. It should be highlighted that 
stock selection or de-selection (i.e. divestment) does not stop at the selected portfolio stage. 
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This is because portfolio management and engagement are on-going processes. When there is 
concrete evidence that certain stocks are not up to the desired ESG standards and fail to 
demonstrate improvements after sufficient engagement, divestment will be the result. Yet, as 
institutional investors may hold a large quantity of shares in these underperforming 
companies, which can have substantial impact on the interests of not just the investees but 
also the ultimate individual shareholders, divestment is normally viewed as a last resort 
(Danish Ministry for Economics and Business Affairs, 2011). 
 
Figure 2-2 Responsible investment processes 
Sources: Based on DMEBA (2011), Sullivan & Mackenzie (2006) and Zarbafi (2011)  
2.4 Responsible Investment in China 
Responsible investment is a relatively new concept in China, with the first responsible fund 
launched by Aegon-Industrial in 2008 and the responsible investment market has been 
growing steadily since then (BSR, 2009; Guo, 2012). According to Guo (2008), the idea of 
responsible investment in China was first encouraged by the collaboration between the 
People’s Bank of China and the State Environmental Protection Agency to set up a database 
documenting companies’ pollution records, which would be referenced when issuing 
corporate loans. Then in 2006 the Bank of China Investment Management launched the 
Sustainable Growth Equity Fund by incorporating some elements of responsible investment 
but without packaging it as a complete responsible investment fund as the Bank was unsure 
about the market’s reception towards the new idea of responsible investment. Then in 2008 
the Equator Principles, a global framework on assessing and managing environmental and 
social risks in project financing, set foot in China and further boosted the market’s awareness 
of responsible practices in banking and finance. As mentioned earlier, the same year saw the 
launch of the first official responsible fund by Aegon-Industrial. Since then, a range of 
responsible investment products were developed in China, including for example funds that 
invest directly in securities with sound ESG performances, thematic investment such as funds 
specialised on green technologies, exchange traded funds that were linked to stock indexes of 
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corporate social responsibility (Guo, 2012). Below is a list of recent responsible investment 
products in China: 
2009 Socially Responsible Exchange Traded Fund linked to the Social 
Responsibility Index of Shanghai Stock Exchange by China Construction Bank 
Asset Management 
2010  Low Carbon Pioneer Fund by Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation 
2010 Green New Energy Fund by Zhonghai 
2011 Green Equity Fund by Aegon 
2011 Socially Responsible Equity Fund by China Universal Asset Management 
 
At the same time, China’s growing interest in responsible investment was also promoted by a 
number of corporate scandals related to ESG issues, for example the nation-wide 
contaminated milk formula by Sanlu in 2008, waves of suicides by workers at Foxconn in 
2010, industrial air emissions leading to chronic air pollution in cities like Beijing, etc. 
Investors, consumers, the general public, media and other stakeholders became more and 
more aware of a company’s role in contributing to the environmental and social wellbeing of 
society. Moreover, government agencies and various stock exchanges in mainland China and 
Hong Kong have pushed forward the non-financial disclosure of listed companies, which 
facilitated responsible investors to locate and analyse the ESG data of potential and current 
investee companies. For instance, in 2006 the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission issued a corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting guideline 
that required all state-owned enterprises to publish CSR reports by 2012 (BSR, 2012). The 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges also started requiring a subset of listed companies to 
report non-financial data in 2008 while the Hong Kong Stock Exchange launched a guideline 
on ESG disclosure in 2011.  
While responsible investment is a fairly recent phenomenon in China, the country’s overall 
ESG development is also in a nascent stage. Indeed a study by BSR (2009) showed that 
China’s ESG performance mostly ranked below other major emerging markets Brazil, Russia 
and India, who together with China were usually referred as the acronym ‘BRIC’. For instance, 
China ranked third among the BRIC countries in environmental performance. Fast-paced 
industrialisation without proper environmental abatement measures have contributed to 
significant negative environmental impacts such as air and water pollution. In the social realm, 
while China topped the list in terms of economic indicators such as the ease of doing 
businesses and the Global Competitive Index, again it ranked third in the Human 
Development Index. Particularly income disparity between the urban and rural communities 
was a stark problem in China. Among the BRIC countries, China’s governance ranked second 
best on the Corruption Perception Index. The negative impact of corruption had been 
recognised by the government, who attempted to combat corrupted behaviour and promote 
higher business ethics. However, in general transparency and disclosure of business operations 
remained limited (BSR, 2009).  
2.5 Summary 
To conclude, this Chapter has presented the historical development of responsible investment 
as a concept. The current definition of responsible investment by the UNPRI is a result of 
various movements in the history of financial investment, which have been informed by the 
changing theories on business management. The basic key actors and operating processes of 
responsible investment were also examined.  
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Given the diversified engagement practices within the industry, the thesis will work with a 
looser definition of engagement when collecting data from engagement practitioners. This 
shall encompass all forms of communications between any engagement practitioners and the 
Chinese investees. However, when surveying and interviewing Chinese investee companies, 
the narrower definition of engagement that emphasises the aim to improve investees’ ESG 
performance and is more in line with the UNPRI will be employed. Such a flexible use of the 
terms in two data collection phases is necessary to (1) provide an overview of the current 
norms of the engagement industry while (2) exploring how Chinese investee companies 
perceive the concept of engagement as reflected by the highest industry standard (i.e. the 
UNPRI). Moreover, as some investors actually conduct engagement themselves instead of 
hiring external engagement firms, the term ‘engagement practitioner’ shall include both types 
of organisations. Finally, the review of responsible investment in China will serve as a useful 
background for the thesis’ research.  
The next chapter will move on to elaborate in details the thesis’ analytical frameworks and 
methodology. 
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3 Analytical Framework & Methodology 
After delineating the responsible investment sector, its key actors and processes as well 
China’s recent development of responsible investment in the previous chapter, the thesis now 
turns to elaborate the analytical framework and the research methodology employed to 
investigate how Chinese investee companies perceives and understand engagement, based on 
which recommendations on engagement services can be further developed.  
3.1 Analytical Framework 
As previous literature review showed that perspectives from investee companies within the 
responsible investment sector were almost non-existent, the choice of relevant analytical 
framework should help the author gather and analyse such data. Moreover, the research 
questions developed by this thesis essentially centre around the interactions between 
engagement practitioners and the Chinese investee companies. Therefore organisational and 
inter-organisational theories with regards to corporate social responsibility and responsible 
investment were thus the focus of the search for relevant frameworks. Based on these 
research criteria, two independent theoretical concepts were identified, translated into the 
responsible investment context and finally merged to form a synthesised analytical framework 
to guide the data collection and subsequent analysis processes. The first concept was 
developed by Zarbafi (2011), who argued that successful engagement was driven by making 
sense of corporate responsibility collectively by both of the institutional investor and the 
investee company. The second one was put forward by Margolis and Walsh (2003), who called 
for descriptive research into an organisation’s decision-making processes of corporate social 
initiatives. Based on these two concepts, an analytical framework tailored for this thesis was 
developed, as described in Section 3.1.3. 
3.1.1 Normative Inter-organisational Sense-making Categorisation 
Zarbafi (2011)’s proposition on inter-organisational collective sense-making of social 
responsibility shed light on how a normative approach could be a useful research tool to 
understand what factors would contribute to the so-called ‘successful engagement’, i.e. 
investees adopting engagement comments and advices to improve their environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) standards. The foundation of her collective sense-making approach 
was based on Senge (2006)’s idea of balancing advocacy and inquiry through reciprocal 
inquiry. According to this argument, organisations should not only state their advocacy, but 
also inquire into the principles and logic behind the other organisation in a dialogue. In short, 
they should understand how the other organisation arrive at their current way of thinking and 
choice of action, an idea similar to the concept by Margolis and Walsh (2003) and would be 
further discussed in Section 3.1.2. To further categorise different forms of advocacy and 
inquiry processes, Zarbafi (2011) took reference from Ross and Roberts (1994)’s framework 
of analysis. Such a framework categorised acts of advocacy and inquiry into the matrix of four 
types of activities, namely (1) Observing, (2) Telling, (3) Asking and (4) Generating. Figure 3-1 
showed sample acts under each of the four categories and their corresponding levels of 
advocacy and inquiry.  
While Ross and Roberts (1994)’s framework of advocacy and inquiry focused on the inter-
personal level, Zarbafi (2011) broadened the original framework into an inter-organisational one 
and explored which types of acts by the institutional investors and the investee company 
would lead to a higher degree of collective sense-making about corporate responsibility. The 
four types of inter-organisational advocacy and inquiry processes developed by her, namely (1) 
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Screening, (2) Questionnaires, (3) Shareholder Activism and (4) Shareholder Engagement, 
were summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Categorisation of different types of inter-personal activities based on the level of advocacy and inquiry 
Source: Adapted from Ross & Roberts (1994)  
As presented in Table 1, Zarbafi (2011) argued that different types of inter-organisational 
advocacy and inquiry processes would create different levels of collective sense-making. In an 
Observing situation, since the investee company was not involved in the data collection and 
analysis processes (e.g. screening of companies based on publicly available ESG information) 
conducted by the institutional investors and/or engagement firms, both of the levels of 
advocacy and inquiry were low. Therefore the level of collective sense-making was also 
‘minimal’, meaning the engagement practitioner and the investee company could only 
constitute a nominal account of corporate responsibility in their corresponding work 
environment. How they understood responsibility remained independent of each other.  
In an Asking situation, while the level of inquiry was high, the level of advocacy was low. This 
was mostly because when asking the investee companies their ESG performance, for example 
through a questionnaire, the reasoning behind each of the questions might not be sufficiently 
provided by the engagement practitioner. Without such advocacy, investees were ‘left alone 
with interpreting the questions’ and might fail to understand why these questions were 
important and relevant (Zarbafi, 2011). This would lead to the ‘fragmented’ collective sense-
making of what corporate responsibility was among the investees and engagement 
practitioners, and therefore inconsistent actions with regards to what would be considered as 
responsible behaviour.  
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The Telling situation was the flip of the Asking situation, where the level of inquiry was low 
but the level of advocacy was high. Although the investee companies could now understand 
the logic behind the engagement practitioners through Shareholder Activism, e.g. as expressed 
in proxy voting or filing shareholder resolution, there was no room for investees to 
communicate what and why they think to the practitioners. The subsequent collective sense-
making was only restricted, producing ‘narrow’ accounts of what corporate responsibility 
meant from the engagement practitioners’ point of view. It could be anticipated that one-time 
actions to address ESG issues might be undertaken by the investee company to satisfy the 
practitioners but whether such actions could be sustained remained doubtful. 
Table 1 Definition of the processes of advocacy and inquiry in the context of responsible investment 
Ross & Roberts 
(1994) 
Zarbafi (2011) 
Categories of inter-
personal activities 
Categories of inter-
organisational 
advocacy/inquiry process 
Original definition Level of 
Advocacy 
Level of 
Inquiry 
Type  of 
Collective 
Sense-making 
Observing Screening The process by which members of 
organization A engage in collective 
sense-making by gathering 
information about organization B 
without directly getting in touch 
with each other. 
Low Low Minimal 
Asking Questionnaires The process by which members of 
organization A engage in collective 
sense-making by inquiring 
information about organization B 
that goes beyond the data that is 
already publicly provided by 
members of organization B. 
Low High Fragmented 
Telling Shareholder Activism The process by which members of 
organization A engage in collective 
sense-making by advocating their 
reasoning of how to make sense of 
the environment to members of 
organization B with little inquiry 
into organization B’s sense-making. 
High Low Restricted 
Generating Shareholder 
Engagement 
The process by which members of 
organization A engage in collective 
sense-making with members of 
organization B by advocating their 
reasoning to alternative views and 
inquiring into the way members of 
organization B make sense of the 
environment. 
High High Enhanced 
Source: Zarbafi (2011)  
Finally the Generating situation signified high levels of advocacy and inquiry and Zarbafi 
(2011) classified the corresponding inter-organisational processes as ‘Shareholder 
Engagement’. These processes, such as one-to-one meetings, were likely to allow both the 
engagement practitioners and investee companies involved to make sense of corporate 
responsibility collectively, and thus continuously refining such sense-making. This would give 
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rise to rich and unitary accounts of corporate responsibility, which would be indispensable to 
sustain consistent actions to improve a company’s ESG performance.  
3.1.2 Descriptive Organisational Decision-making Research 
Companies and their stakeholders had debated for long what a firm’s social role and in 
particular its corporate social responsibility (CSR) was. While proponents like Milton 
Friedman (1970) viewed that a company’s only CSR was to create profit, others believed a 
firm should integrate CSR into operations, for example, minimising the environmental and 
social impact of business to stakeholders. Much of the debate revolved around how a firm, 
which was supposed to be a rational entity under neoclassical economics principles, should 
justify the costs of exercising CSR and whether CSR would bring about financial return. This 
unresolved debate between a firm’s corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate 
financial performance (CFP) was similar to the one discussed by Margolis and Walsh (2003).  
Margolis and Walsh (2003) examined the debate on whether companies should respond to 
social miseries external to the organisations while balancing out the financial considerations. 
They proposed instead of asking whether, researchers should take a step backward and 
systematically inquire how an organisation decided whether or not it should respond to 
requests for social initiatives. By social initiatives the authors meant activities to alleviate social 
problems that would generate social and public good. This, for example, included donations 
to social misery such as hunger and poverty, company-led awareness campaigns, partnering 
with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) etc. Their literature review showed that much 
of the discussion on whether a firm should participate in such initiatives could be diminished 
into the classical debate of a firm’s CFP versus its CSP, e.g. evaluating the financial value of 
certain social actions. Yet after so many years of research, there had not been any conclusive 
results in terms of the positive or negative correlations between CFP and CSP.  
Following the pragmatic approach advocated by James (1975), Margolis and Walsh (2003) first 
assumed that companies could ‘play an effective role in ameliorating social misery’, and 
therefore they would respond to such social requests. This assumption shifted the researcher’s 
focus from the traditional CFP-CSP debate, and immediately brought new research questions 
into light. The research direction now turned into the examination of the impact of a 
company’s social initiatives and how such impact could be realised. The authors then 
developed a ‘descriptive research agenda’, which inquires the following five areas:  
(1) how the stimuli for action is extracted or appraised,  
(2) how response options are generated,  
(3) how options are evaluated,  
(4) how the selected option is implemented and;  
(5) what the subsequent corporate social and financial performances are.  
To them, understanding how a company decided on what they should do with social miseries 
was the first step towards understanding organisational behaviour, which would bring 
researchers to the next level, the normative research agenda on how company should respond 
to social miseries. It was clear that the authors’ pragmatic approach did not evade from the 
traditional debate mentioned above but indeed took another route to tackle the classical 
question.  
While the ultimate quest of Margolis and Walsh (2003) for a normative theory on 
organisational behaviour was less relevant to this thesis, their insight in the descriptive agenda 
is a useful point of reference to make sense of how Chinese investee companies perceive and 
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respond to engagement. Indeed, company’s responses to social misery can be mirrored to 
investee companies’ responses to ESG engagement practices as both social misery and 
engagement are external to the organisation in question and call for the organisation’s 
attention to address certain aspects of CSP. Besides, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
development of responsible investment was partly fuelled by the growing awareness and 
acceptance of stakeholder value, as opposed to the traditional shareholder value. The situation 
where a company evaluating and balancing these two values is similar to a company’s debate 
about CSP and CFP in Margolis and Walsh (2003)’s case. The five descriptive question listed 
above will be further elaborated with reference to the context of responsible investment in the 
following section.  
3.1.3 A Synthesised Analytical Framework for the Thesis 
The normative and descriptive research approaches proposed by Zarbafi (2011) and Margolis 
and Walsh (2003) respectively were combined into a synthesized analytical framework to guide 
the thesis’ research on the interactions between the engagement practitioners and Chinese 
investee companies. As shown in Figure 3-2, engagement practitioners and Chinese investee 
companies were connected through the act of ESG engagement. Firstly, the normative inter-
organisational sense-making categorisation method was used to examine the overall types of 
engagement activities experienced and perceived by both of the engagement practitioners and 
Chinese investees. Secondly, the descriptive research method on organisational decision-
making was applied to particularly expose how Chinese investee companies made decisions 
regarding ESG engagement. Findings by both research approaches were indispensable to 
further developing recommendations to enhance engagement activities and their levels of 
collective sense-making. The following section explains how these two agendas are translated 
into the thesis’ research scope and merged to form the synthesised analytical framework to 
guide the data collection methodology and the subsequent analysis. 
 
Figure 3-2 The synthesised analytical framework 
3.1.3.1 Collective Sense-making of Engagement in China 
When applying Zarbafi (2011)’s collective sense-making categorisation to map out the kind of 
ESG engagement activities in China, it should be highlighted that both of the engagement 
practitioners and Chinese investee companies could be the inquiring organisation or the 
receiving one. Although it is usually the engagement practitioners, either the institutional 
investors or professional engagement firms, who initiate the communications and interactions, 
investee companies may also conduct the reciprocal inquiry to the engagement practitioners in 
the process. In short, reciprocal inquiry is dynamic in nature and any party involved in an 
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inter-organisational relationship can exercise it at any point of the interaction. Therefore in the 
data collection phase, special attention should be paid to situation where Chinese investee 
companies take the initiative to conduct advocacy and/or inquiry and to examine how such 
initiatives impact the level of collective sense-making of engagement.  
Moreover, Zarbafi (2011) defined ‘engagement’ much more narrowly than this thesis. In fact, 
she considered engagement as an ‘informal approach to participating in corporate 
management decision-making’ and was only present in the Generating types of activities (see 
the last row of Table 1). Therefore, ‘engagement’ would not include acts of ‘Shareholder 
Activism’ (see the third row of Table 1). While such a distinction between ‘engagement’ and 
‘activism’ may be useful in theory, this is less practical and applicable in reality. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, practitioners of responsible investments held diverging views of what 
‘engagement’ meant and entailed. It could range from a passive questionnaire to a one-to-one 
meeting. To further complicate the picture, sometimes filing shareholder resolutions (example 
of Shareholder Activism) may be done in conjunction with one-to-one meetings (example of 
Shareholder Engagement) before the formal submission resolution. In such cases, should both 
shareholder resolutions and meetings be considered ‘engagement’, since they are indeed within 
the same project scope serving the same aim? As such, the thesis works from the view that 
engagement should not be defined by the kind of acts, but by its aim, i.e. whether it tries to 
‘seek changes’ in the investee companies no matter through meetings or filing shareholder 
resolution (AICD, 2011).  
To minimise the confusion of the use of terms, the thesis will therefore use ‘Shareholder 
Dialogue’ to replace ‘Shareholder Engagement’ in Zarbafi (2011)’s original framework. The 
matrix of the types of collective sense-making (in capital letters) and their respective advocacy 
and inquiry processes (italicised) are redrawn in Figure 3-3. This matrix helps the thesis 
identify the types of advocacy and inquiry processes, or in other words engagement practices, 
conducted or received by the engagement practitioners and Chinese investee companies 
respectively. 
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Figure 3-3 Types of inter-organisational collective sense-making produced by different types of advocacy and 
inquiry processes 
Source: Adapted from Zarbafi (2011)  
3.1.3.2 Five Descriptive Questions for Chinese Investee Companies 
Apart from mapping out the different types of engagement practices, the thesis also modified 
the five descriptive questions proposed by Margolis and Walsh (2003) to inquire how Chinese 
investee companies perceived engagement practices and decided what they would do 
regarding them.  
The first question concerned ‘how the stimuli for action are extracted or appraised’ (Margolis 
& Walsh, 2003). In the authors’ original discussion, these stimuli could include both internal 
and external ones and solicited and unsolicited ones. ‘Stimuli for action’ from the perspective 
of the Chinese investee companies in the thesis’ context were the engagement services 
received from either institutional investors or engagement firms. Therefore such stimuli were 
basically external and unsolicited in nature. Based on this understanding, the relevant 
questions to be asked to the Chinese investees would be what types of engagement (the 
stimuli) they had received, for example, questionnaire on ESG performance, meeting requests 
to discuss ESG issues, recommendations on how to improve ESG standards etc.  
The second question was ‘how response options are generated’. Relevant questions to Chinese 
investee companies would be, for example, if they had responded to engagement by evaluating 
their internal capacity and available resources, by comparing with how industry competitors 
responded to ESG issues, by analysing national laws and/or international norms etc. It would 
also be interesting to see which departments and management level within the company were 
involved in the option generating process. 
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The third question was ‘how options are evaluated’. This would look into what criteria 
Chinese investee companies used in evaluating the options, such as cost implications of 
complying with certain international ESG norms, company’s reputational value/risks, impact 
on stock value, potential divestment by investors etc. This would provide insights into how 
Chinese investees evaluated, ranked and then selected their response to engagement.  
The fourth question asked how the selected option was implemented. In the context of 
Chinese investee companies, it would be illuminating to find out what they would do to 
deliver their choice of action. For instance, if they decided that the ESG issues raised in 
engagement processes were not relevant, did they simply ignore the engagement initiatives by 
the investor or and the engagement firms? On the other hand, if they decided to address 
certain ESG issues suggested by the engagement practitioners, how did they manage and 
execute such a decision? Did they rely on internal or external resources? Did they have well-
defined goals and system to manage the progress of their actions? 
Finally the fifth question was what the subsequent corporate social and financial performances 
of their decisions were. This would inquire into the impact of the Chinese investee companies’ 
response to engagement. For example, did reputational value, financial return, company’s 
understanding of ESG issues etc. improve as a consequence of their decision to respond 
positively to engagement practices? The above sub-questions generated from Margolis and 
Walsh (2003)’s descriptive research approach would help stakeholders understand better how 
Chinese investee companies perceived and responded to engagement, and therefore identify 
strategies to better motivate them in the engagement process. 
3.2 Methodology 
The thesis employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. 
The former referred to two different sets of questionnaires sent to engagement practitioners 
and Chinese investee companies. The latter included a month-long unpaid internship at GES 
Denmark, an engagement practitioner headquartered in Stockholm, and semi-structured 
interviews with selected engagement practitioners, Chinese investee companies, other industry 
experts and academics. 
Questions of the questionnaires were developed based on the synthesised analytical 
framework discussed in section 3.1.3 and input from stakeholders, including academics and 
engagement practitioners. Participants’ informed consent was requested and confirmed and 
their provided data was kept in strict confidentiality and would be reported anonymously in 
the thesis. Online questionnaire was avoided because the desired online service provider, 
Google Inc., was not fully accessible in China. The questionnaires were therefore created 
using Microsoft Word that allowed participants to select or type in their answers electronically 
to enhance the ease of participation. Chinese investee companies had the option to complete 
either the Chinese or the English version of the questionnaire. For a copy of the informed 
consent form and the questionnaires, please refer to Appendix 2 and 3. A total of 44 
practitioners of responsible investment or ESG engagement were identified based on desktop 
research and 117 Chinese investee companies (exclusive of those with low ESG risks based on 
GES’ Risk Rating Model) were selected from the MSCI Emerging Markets Index (MSCI 
EMI). The Index is a respectable stock index tracking the performance of 821 constituent 
companies in 21 “emerging markets” countries as defined by the MSCI, a provider of 
investment decision support tools to global investors. Chinese companies covered in the 
MSCI EMI are either listed in the Shanghai, Shenzhen or Hong Kong stock exchanges.  
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Engagement practitioners and Chinese investee companies were invited to participate in this 
thesis research slightly differently. For engagement practitioners, an electronic copy of the 
questionnaire was sent with follow-up calls and email. All of the questionnaire invitations 
addressed identified personnel responsible for engagement or ESG issues from publicly 
available sources. For the Chinese investee companies, however, they were first contacted by 
phone before receiving the questionnaire. This was because previous studies with Chinese 
companies suggested that they were in general quite reluctant to respond to research requests 
and researchers were advised to first establish contact with companies via phone before 
sending the questionnaires, which was believed to encourage a higher response rate (BSR, 
2009). As the questionnaire was about the interaction with institutional investors, the investor 
relations department or the company secretary was contacted. Due to the relatively large 
sample size of companies, only 56 companies with non-financial disclosure on websites or in 
sustainability reports were first contacted by phone before receiving the questionnaire, while 
the rest of the sample companies received the questionnaire invite directly. All companies 
were given three weeks to submit the completed questionnaires. 
The original design of the research methodology was to invite companies to fill out the 
questionnaires and subsequently invite the more relevant participants to a semi-structured 
interview to explore in depth their experience of engagement. While it was originally 
anticipated that a 10% response rate could be achieved for both questionnaires, the response 
rate of Chinese investee companies was extremely low, with only two completed 
questionnaires at the third week after the questionnaires were sent. As such an alternative data 
collection plan, encompassing the collection of primary and secondary data, was devised. 
Table 2 below described how the alternative plan covered various sets of targeted data of the 
original plan. Instead of relying on the original sample size of 117 companies, other Chinese 
listed companies and the Chinese offices of international companies were invited to interviews 
through personal networks of the author, alumni and faculty. This was envisioned to provide 
primary data on Chinese companies’ perspective. Meanwhile, interviews with China specialists 
and academics and various industry research reports were used as secondary data to 
supplement the limited direct responses from Chinese investee companies.  
Table 2 Data covered by the alternative data collection plan  
Original Plan Alternative Plan 
Method Targeted Data  
to be Collected 
Method Data Type 
Questionnaires 
and interviews 
with Chinese 
investee 
companies 
 
Sample size: 117 
companies 
Chinese investee companies’ 
experience and perception of 
engagement practices  
 Interviews with Chinese 
investee companies (through 
personal networks) 
Primary 
How Chinese investee 
companies respond to 
engagement  
 Interviews with China 
specialists and academics 
 Industry research reports 
Secondary 
What motivates Chinese 
investee companies to improve 
their ESG performance   
 Interviews with Chinese 
investee companies & China 
offices of international firms 
(through personal networks) 
Primary 
 
As discussed above, selected questionnaire participants were invited to interviews for a more 
in-depth discussion. Such interview questions were developed based on their questionnaire 
responses. However, as interviewees in the alternative plan did not answer the questionnaire in 
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the first place, their interview questions were modified from the questionnaire. In any case, the 
aim of the interview was to allow the author to ‘appreciate the different constructions and 
meanings that people place upon their experience’ (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe, 1995). 
Appendix 4 and 5 presented the list of interviews and interview questions respectively. 
Apart from questionnaires and interviews, the thesis research employed participant 
observation through a one-month unpaid internship at GES Denmark (GES). The aim of the 
internship was to observe how engagement with investee companies was conducted by 
professional engagement firm and obtain first-hand experience of engaging with them. While 
the information and experience obtained from the internship would not contribute directly to 
answering the research questions, a deeper understanding of the industry’s operations and its 
operating environment would help guide the author in the actual data collection through 
questionnaires and interviews, and the subsequent data analysis. Given the author’s double 
roles as a researcher and an intern, special measures were undertaken to ensure the integrity of 
the thesis research and internship. The scope of works during the internship would not be 
mixed with that of the thesis research. For instance, as an intern at GES, the author would 
only perform engagement-related tasks on companies outside of the thesis’ sample. At the 
same time, business information obtained in the internship was kept confidential. The author’s 
role as a thesis researcher was also made known to all of the staff at GES. Moreover, the 44 
engagement practitioners were informed about the author’s unpaid internship (without 
disclosing the company name) as part of the research methodology when they were invited to 
fill out the questionnaires.  
Data collected through questionnaire and interviews were analysed using the synthesized 
framework discussed in Section 3.1.3. Different kinds of advocacy and inquiry processes 
regarding ESG issues in the Chinese context were mapped out to identify the types of 
collective sense-making they had contributed to. These were invaluable data to indicate if 
engagement had been done to reach enhanced collective sense-making of responsible 
investment and ESG issues, which according to Zarbafi (2011) was the most ideal form of 
interaction to influence an investee company’s ESG performance. Besides exploring how 
Chinese companies made organisational decisions about ESG engagement would expose the 
factors that drove or hinder them to respond positively towards engagement. Based on these 
findings and analyses, recommendations on how to improve engagement practices to attain a 
higher level of collective sense-making of ESG issues were then developed. These would help 
engagement practitioners interact with Chinese investee companies and motivate them to 
adopt higher ESG standards and therefore strengthen the overall business case of responsible 
investment. 
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4 Findings 
This chapter presents the findings collected in questionnaires and various interviews. The 
original sample size of the thesis research included (1) 44 engagement practitioners (including 
institutional investors and engagement firms) and (2) 117 Chinese investee companies. A total 
of eight engagement practitioners responded to the invite but only seven of them had 
completed the questionnaires, six of which were signatories of the Principles for Responsible 
Investment backed by the United Nations. Hence a 16% response rate was achieved among 
the engagement practitioners, which was higher than the anticipated 10%. Among the 
respondents three were institutional investors and four were engagement firms; and six 
companies were subsequently contacted in follow-up interviews. Besides, two of the contacted 
companies preferred brief interviews instead of filling out the questionnaires. One company 
declined to participate but had generously shared an internal research report on engagement 
practices in China. 
The response rate of Chinese investee companies was, however, much lower. To start with, 
out of the sample of 117 investees, five companies’ email addresses could not be located on 
the company website or through desktop research and 15 companies’ publicly disclosed email 
addresses were dysfunctional. In other words, the effective sample size of companies was 
downsized by 17% to 97. Only two companies completed the questionnaires with another two 
agreed to conduct a brief interview on phone. The majority of Chinese investee companies 
either declined to participate or did not provide any response at all. Table 3 below summarises 
the various responses and their corresponding percentage of the effective sample size. 
Table 3 Summary of response rate of Chinese investee companies 
 Number Percentage 
Effective sample size 97 100% 
Agreed to participate in questionnaire or interview 3 3% 
Declined to participate in questionnaire or interview 35 36% 
Nil response at all 59 61% 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, an alternative data collection plan was devised to address 
the low response rates among Chinese investee companies. Under this plan, a Chinese 
investee company, an academic and a researcher on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in 
China, two Chinese branch offices of international companies and a sustainability consultant 
advising Chinese corporate clients were interviewed. The complete list of interviews could be 
found in Appendix 4 and the interview questions in Appendix 5.  
As a result, a total of 20 interviews including follow-up discussion with questionnaire 
respondents and interviewees of the alternative plan were conducted. Both of the 
questionnaires and interviews were the key sources of findings to address the research 
questions. Other literature such as industry research report as well as experience and 
observations obtained in the author’s internship were used to supplement the key findings, 
where appropriate.  
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4.1 Collective Sense-making by Engagement Practitioners and 
Chinese Investees 
4.1.1 ESG Engagement Activities 
Data from both of the engagement practitioners (see Appendix 2 Question 8) and Chinese 
investee companies (see Appendix 3 Question 4) show that the kind of engagement activities 
conducted or experienced basically covered all of the four categories of advocacy and inquiry 
processes suggested by Zarbafi (2011), i.e. (1) Screening, (2) Questionnaires, (3) Shareholder 
Activism and (4) Shareholder Dialogue. Figure 4-1 shows the frequency of engagement 
activities cited by engagement practitioners, with the activities grouped according to the type 
of advocacy and inquiry process1. The top three most frequently quoted activities by 
engagement practitioners are environmental, social and governance (ESG) evaluation using 
publicly available data (Screening), face-to-face meetings or teleconferences (Shareholder 
Dialogue) and ESG rating and recommendation reports to investees (Shareholder Activism). 
The bottom three least frequently quoted activities by engagement practitioners are filing 
shareholder resolutions and divestment with explanation, which are both examples of 
Shareholder Activism, as well as request for progress reports on addressing ESG issues 
(Questionnaires). Indeed none of the responded engagement practitioners exercised filing of 
shareholder resolutions before. In subsequent interviews, engagement practitioners revealed 
that they viewed such an action as ‘rather aggressive’ and ‘almost hostile’ to the Chinese 
investee companies and would only use them as the last resort (II1, personal communications, 
30 April, 2013; ESP6, personal communications, 2 May, 2013). 
Similar to findings of previous studies (BSR, 2011), both engagement practitioners and 
Chinese investee companies agreed that the most effective communication channels were 
face-to-face meetings, teleconference and company or site visits, all of which were classified as 
Shareholder Dialogue in Zarbafi (2011)’s matrix. An engagement practitioner placed very high 
priority on face-to-face meetings because they were the key trust-building tool with Chinese 
investee companies to demonstrate that they had a long-term interest in the companies and let 
the companies understand why they cared about ESG issues at all (II1, personal 
communications, 30 April, 2013). A Chinese investee company also found that meetings, face-
to-face or via phone, were most helpful to them as they could exchange views with the 
engagement practitioners so that they could better understand which direction the 
practitioners were after, what ESG themes they cared about and their overall expectations on 
ESG issues (IRO2, personal communications, 29 April, 2013). Another interviewed company 
maintained that discussions on ESG matters with institutional investors in meetings were 
similar to a ‘soul searching’ exercise for the company. It was an excellent learning opportunity 
for the company to improve its understanding on such issues (IRO1, personal 
communications, 16 April, 2013). During the author’s internship, it was also observed that 
calling investee companies to discuss ESG issues was much more effective than sending 
emails as teleconference allowed all the parties involved to explain their point of view in 
details. 
                                                 
1 ‘Collaborate engagement by more than one investor’, which was in the questionnaire and cited by two 
practitioners, is not included in the figure because it lacks contextual information on how the collaborative 
engagement is done, for example by means of meetings or letters, and is therefore impossible to assign it to any 
of the four categories.  
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Birgitte Nielsen, Head of Corporate Social Responsibility at the Investment Fund for 
Developing Country (IFU), also agreed that having mutual understanding with Chinese 
companies was indispensable to promoting better CSR standards (personal communications, 
16 May, 2013). IFU collaborates with Danish partners to invest in countries including China 
through different capital provision schemes. All of these investment projects need to fulfil 
IFU’s CSR standards. When working with the local companies in China, IFU observed that 
the cultural differences between China and Denmark led to different understanding of ESG 
issues. For instance, it was much more common in China to resort to bribing partners with 
expensive gifts or extravagant meals to achieve what they wanted. Nielsen pointed out that the 
key to address these issues was not the ‘practical things’ because Chinese companies had what 
it took to fulfil certain standards if they wished to. The key, instead, was to establish guanxi 
(meaning relationship in Mandarin) with the Chinese companies. By getting acquainted with 
Chinese companies, IFU could better understand the cultural differences between itself and 
the Chinese companies. Such a mutual understanding would help the parties involved to look 
for solutions together. 
 
Figure 4-1 Question 8: Frequency of engagement practices cited by engagement practitioners 
But not all engagement practitioners were able to carry out meetings or visits as frequently as 
they had wished. Two out of the five engagement practitioners who had indicated that face-
to-face meetings were one of their regular engagement activities did not carry out any of them 
in 2012. The other three respondents had conducted meetings with 25% to 100% of the 
Chinese investee companies they were engaging in 2012 (see Table 4). Practitioner No. 2, an 
institutional investor, maintained that the high meeting ratio with investees in 2012 was due to 
the fact they had a policy to meet with the investees in their portfolio. Besides, they were 
based in China, had local staff in the office and only invested in Chinese investee companies 
(II2, personal communications, 2 May, 2013).  
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Table 4 Questions 9 & 10: Number of meetings conducted by engagement practitioners in 2012 
Responding engagement 
practitioners 
Number of Chinese 
investees engaged in 2012 
Number of meetings with 
Chinese investees in 2012 
Percentage 
Practitioner No. 2 100 100 100% 
Practitioner No. 3 100 0 0% 
Practitioner No. 6 1016 0 0% 
Practitioner No. 7 31 20 65% 
Practitioner No. 8 20 5 25% 
 
Other responding engagement practitioners explained that meeting arrangements were usually 
guided by the need for additional information, client investors’ request, the availability of 
resources and even political circumstances (ESP7, personal communications, 2 May, 2013; 
ESP4, personal communications, 29 April, 2013; ESP5, personal communications, 30 April, 
2013; II1, personal communications, 30 April, 2013). For example, engagement practitioners 
might initiate meetings with Chinese investees if they could not find adequate information on 
the investees’ ESG performance from publicly available sources or if they had specific 
questions regarding their ESG standards after analysing the company. Some other 
practitioners based outside of China found it less feasible to fly frequently to China for 
meetings. Sometimes meetings would be arranged because of the special request of the client 
investors that the engagement practitioners represented. One respondent observed that the 
status of the political relations between China and the respondent's country might affect the 
ease to conduct meetings with Chinese investee companies. 
Chinese investee companies indicated that questionnaires on ESG issues (example of the 
advocacy and inquiry process Questionnaires) and reports on ESG rating and 
recommendations (example of Shareholder Activism) were also informative for them to 
understand institutional investors’ expectation on their ESG performance (see Question 13 in 
Appendix 3). One respondent said the company welcomed rating and recommendations 
report because they were good channels to understand the company’s current standing within 
the industry and to reflect the company’s effort in ESG-related matters (IRO2, personal 
communications, 29 April, 2013). Another respondent indicated that the questionnaires 
provided the company a benchmark on ESG standards sought after by the questionnaire 
designers although sometimes the company might find certain questions ‘quite shocking’ and 
might not be very sure if they understood what these questions were asking for. At the same 
time, the respondent reflected that the company had experienced the so-called ‘questionnaire 
fatigue’ when they had to fill out complicated questions. Sometimes it could also be difficult 
for them to express the company’s ESG situation fully in plain text (IRO1, personal 
communications, 16 April, 2013).  
Some engagement practitioners, on the other hand, did not share the same view with the 
Chinese investees on how useful questionnaires were in the engagement process. Indeed only 
three out of seven surveyed practitioners would use questionnaires. One of the reasons was 
that questionnaires were usually designed for a group of respondents. Therefore they might 
not be directly relevant to each of them. An engagement practitioner preferred to ‘cherry-pick’ 
the mostly important and relevant ESG issues to discuss with the investees (II1, personal 
communications, 30 April, 2013). Another practitioner termed questionnaires to be 
‘demotivating’ as investee companies might need to fill out a lot of them for different 
stakeholders already. Plus some investees might already have good ESG disclosure in the 
sustainability reports, which were easily accessible by the practitioner. Thus questionnaires 
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were not considered to be very constructive to engage with investees (ESP6, personal 
communications, 2 May, 2013).  
4.1.2 Understanding of ESG Engagement 
The surveyed and interviewed engagement practitioners showed different understanding of 
‘ESG engagement’. Question 5 in the questionnaire for the engagement practitioners was 
specifically designed to explore this topic (see Appendix 2). It asked the engagement 
practitioners to select the statement(s) that described their approach to ESG engagement. 
Practitioners might choose more than one option from the list of seven: 
 Ongoing monitoring of investee companies’ ESG risks and preparedness 
 ESG engagement is a key step to realise active ownership 
 ESG engagement is carefully documented and reported to stakeholders 
 ESG engagement aims to improve investee companies’ ESG performance 
 Investee companies are inquired how they understand ESG issues 
 Investee companies are inquired why they address ESG issues the way they do 
 ESG engagement actions are always clearly explained to investee companies 
 
The first four options were derived from the United Nations backed Principles for 
Responsible Investment (UNPRI), which do not explicitly call for collective sense-making of 
ESG issues between the investors and investees but should be easily recognised and accepted 
as the conventional approach of ESG engagement. The last three options, on the other hand, 
went beyond the UNPRI and described approaches aiming to expose and exchange the 
investees’ and engagement practitioners’ perspectives on ESG-related issues. As such 
responses regarding the last three options were the key finding for further analysis. Among the 
seven surveyed engagement practitioners, six of them had selected one or more of the last 
three options. Figure 4-2 below presents the frequency of statements selected by the 
engagement practitioners. “How Chinese investee companies understood ESG issues 
received” was chosen by most of the engagement practitioners, followed by “why Chinese 
investee companies addressed the ESG issues the way they did” and then “ESG engagement 
actions were always clearly explained to the investees”. In terms of the response by each of 
the engagement practitioner, only two respondents selected all of these three options while 
two others selected the first two of the three. The remaining two respondents chose one out 
of the three. Clearly respondents were divided in their opinion towards the relevance and 
importance of exchanging understanding on ESG issues with Chinese investees. 
In a follow-up interview, an engagement practitioner explained that their approach to 
engagement was partly dependent on the demand of their client investors or asset managers 
(ESP5, personal communications, 30 April, 2013). As such, their main work was to deliver 
clients’ requests, which might not necessarily match with all of the statements on approach to 
engagement listed in Question 5. Others found that understanding Chinese investee 
companies’ view on ESG issues to be highly important as the engagement practitioner’s own 
ESG analysis on the investees needed to be understood with reference to the investee’s 
operating environment. Inquiring into the Chinese investees’ perspective was also a way of 
showing respect to the companies, allowing them to explain the reasons behind their actions. 
Likewise, clear explanation of the engagement activities and how the investees could get 
involved in the process also demonstrated respect for the companies (ESP6, personal 
communications, May 2, 2013). An engagement practitioner shared that learning why Chinese 
Responsible Investment: Understanding and Improving ESG Engagement with Chinese Investee Companies 
29 
investee companies address ESG matters in certain manner indeed revealed a lot on their 
understanding of such issues: 
‘We have once asked a Chinese investee how it managed labour standard and employee relations 
and the company ended up sending us their insurance documents. So there is clearly a gap 
between investors’ expectation of ESG management and investees’ understanding of ESG 
management (II1, personal communications, 30 April, 2013).’ 
 
Figure 4-2 Question5: Frequency of statements selected by engagement practitioners 
While the above captures how engagement practitioners understand ESG engagement, 
Question 14 in the questionnaire for the Chinese investee companies inquired how well the 
companies understood engagement representatives’ expectations on their ESG performance 
(see Appendix 3). The three responding Chinese investee companies viewed that they were 
most of the times ‘somewhat clear’ about the engagement practitioners’ expectations of their 
performance on environmental risks, labour and human rights issues, community outreach, 
transparency and reporting, as well as corporate governance. For the same five ESG matters, 
engagement practitioners were also asked to assign scores to show their level of relevance to 
Chinese investees in general and the level of difficulty to engage with them on such matters in 
Questions 6 and 7 (see Appendix 2). Figure 4-3Figure 4-3 summarises the average scores 
given by Chinese investee companies to show their level of understanding (Investees’ 
Understanding) and those by engagement practitioners on the levels of relevance and 
difficulty (Engagement Relevance and Engagement Difficulty). On a scale of one to five, five 
denotes higher levels of understanding, relevance and difficulty. One interesting observation 
from the figure is that there seems to be some degree of discrepancy between Chinese 
investee companies self-perceived level of understanding on ESG matters and engagement 
practitioners’ perception. On one hand Chinese investee companies’ self-described levels of 
understanding of engagement practitioners’ expectations on all five ESG issues were roughly 
the same (scores bit above four or ‘somewhat clear’). On the other, engagement practitioners 
found it much more difficult to engage with Chinese investees on the latter than the former.  
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Figure 4-3 Average scores by Chinese investee companies and engagement practitioners on various ESG issues 
Overall, most engagement practitioners indicated that it was more difficult to engage with 
Chinese investee companies on ESG issues than in other emerging markets (EMs) (see 
Question 12 in Appendix 2). From the engagement practitioners’ perspective, the average 
scores of Chinese company’s understanding of responsible investment (RI), responsiveness to 
ESG issues, transparency of operations, China’s regulation and enforcement on ESG issues 
and language barrier of conducting engagement in China were all considered to be worse than 
other EMs. The only item that China scored the same as other EMs was the understanding of 
ESG issues by companies. Figure 4-4 presents the average scores on a scale of one to three. 
While two denotes the same level compared to other EMs, any score below two or above two 
means worse than or better other EMs respectively. An engagement practitioner who had only 
participated in a brief interview commented that sustainability was an under-developed area in 
China and that a lot of awareness raising works would be needed (ESP3, personal 
communications, 22 April, 2013).  
In terms of tracking the impact of engagement with Chinese investee companies (see 
Questions 15 & 16 in Appendix 2), five out of the seven engagement practitioners reported 
that they would set goals for each engagement. The top three methods cited to track the 
progress of engagement was request for proof, regular meetings and company visits. One 
respondent said they did not set any goals for engagement because the only goal of getting in 
touch with Chinese investee companies was to obtain additional information about the 
companies’ ESG performance (II2, personal communications, 2 May, 2013). Another 
respondent felt that setting goals would be ideal but that was not feasible for them at the 
moment because their current engagement activities were mostly sending questionnaires and 
ESG analysis based on publicly available information. Although Chinese investee companies 
might infer from the questionnaires the practitioner’s expectation on ESG standards, overall 
the impact would be very limited. This was particularly so because the respondent’s client 
investor only held a small amount of shares in the Chinese investees, and therefore a relatively 
small power of influence on them (ESP5, personal communications, 30 April, 2013).  
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Figure 4-4 Average scores by engagement practitioners comparing China to other emerging markets 
4.2 Organisational Decision-making by Chinese Investees 
Despite the fact that only two Chinese investee companies had completed the questionnaire, 
data from these respondents and interviews with Chinese investees, Chinese branch offices of 
international companies, researchers and industry experts are able to provide an overview of 
Chinese investee companies’ characteristics with reference to the five descriptive questions on 
their organisational decision making. This section is structured according to these five 
questions.  
The first set of questions concerns how Chinese investee companies first experience or receive 
engagement. The responding companies indicated that they had some experience of 
discussing ESG issues with the institutional investors and/or their engagement representatives 
but all in all those were very rare occasions. The two questionnaire respondents had been 
contacted by institutional investors to discuss ESG issues for twice and five times in 2012 
respectively. Both email and meetings were reported to be the means of communications. One 
interviewed company mentioned that there was only one particular investor, who would 
initiate meetings on corporate social responsibility (CSR) matters every two years as it was a 
long-term shareholder of the company and had an in-house CSR specialist (IRO2, personal 
communications, 16 April, 2013). Another respondent indicated that interactions with 
investors mostly focused on the company’s business operations and performance. Even if a 
discussion on ESG issues was brought up, it was mostly on governance matters (FPRSP, 
personal communications, 24 April, 2013). In terms of the types of engagement activities, all 
of the listed engagement activities in Figure 4-1 above had been at least experienced by one of 
the two questionnaire respondents. Unfortunately the sample size is too small to conclude any 
observable pattern on the type of engagement activities at this point. 
Engagement practitioners and Chinese investee companies’ average scores assigned to various 
communication means are presented in Figure 4-5. Engagement practitioners were asked to 
evaluate the level of difficulty to reach out to Chinese companies through different means on 
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a scale of one (least difficult) to five (highly difficult) (see Question 11 in Appendix 2). And 
Chinese investees were asked to evaluate their preference for such means, again on a scale of 
one (least favoured) to five (highly favoured) (see Question 15 in Appendix 3). Engagement 
practitioners seemed to be quite neutral towards these communication channels, except for 
fax, whose average score was four (somewhat difficult). However in subsequent interviews, 
several respondents stated that it was indeed quite difficult to get in touch with the right 
personnel of the Chinese investee companies to discuss ESG issues (CGSP, personal 
communications, 18 April, 2013; ESP4, personal communications, 29 April, 2013). For 
instance, emails listed on company websites might not work properly and a lot of times phone 
calls were not answered. Overall it was difficult to establish the first contact, a phenomenon 
also observed in previous studies (BSR, 2011), the author’s internship and this thesis research. 
Another engagement practitioner said once they had the first contact, then the subsequent 
communications became fairly easy (ESP1, personal communications, 2 May, 2013). One 
engagement practitioner held the view that shareholding structures in Chinese investee 
companies could affect how they managed investor relations. The respondent’s experience 
was that many of the Chinese investees with families or the state as the majority shareholders 
cared much less about investor relations (IR) or handling investors’ enquiry in general. Their 
IR departments usually worked more with the sales teams of investors, asset managers and 
analysts (ESP2, personal communications, 10 April, 2013). Indeed the wide-spread presence 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was a phenomenon quite unique in China. Yet at the same 
time the government’s control and involvement in these enterprises could make it very 
challenging to engage with these companies (IA, personal communications, 10 April, 2013). 
This was because engagement practitioners were essentially engaging with the government, the 
ultimate owner of the company, instead of a simply private company on ESG issues. As for 
the Chinese investee companies, the most preferred communication channels were email and 
company or site visit. Face-to-face meetings and teleconferences were also preferred while fax 
and postal mail were relatively less desirable. 
 
Figure 4-5 Average scores for communication means by engagement practitioners and Chinese investees 
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The second set of questions is on how Chinese investee companies generate response options 
when they are engaged by the institutional investors or their engagement representatives (see 
Questions 5 & 6 in Appendix 3). The two surveyed Chinese investees said middle and senior 
management were usually involved when discussing ESG issues. One respondent mentioned 
various departments such as corporate social responsibility, corporate communications etc. 
were involved, while the other maintained that only the investor relations personnel was 
involved. Experience of engagement practitioners showed that not all of the Chinese investee 
companies have dedicated personnel on CSR or ESG matters. One respondent found that 
sometimes even when a Chinese investee had a CSR personnel, such information might not 
be disclosed. Hence they would have to contact the company secretary or the IR team to 
discuss ESG issues (ESP7, personal communications, 2 May, 2013). Very often the IR officer 
in a company did not only maintain investor relations but carried other titles and 
responsibilities within the company as well (ESP2, personal communications, 10 April, 2013). 
Overall, these personnel were not very familiar with the company’s CSR development, its 
ESG issues or even the broader concept of responsible investment. In short, ESG issues had 
not been included in the corporate agenda by many companies. Very often the top 
management did not understand such issues and provide support for addressing them 
strategically (Weihua Liu, personal communications, 23 April, 2013). Even when these issues 
were addressed, they were mostly done in an impulsive manner without careful planning, in 
response to occurred crisis or simply because of the personal affiliation of individual 
management personnel (Baocheng Liu, personal communications, 9 April, 2013). A 
sustainability consultant serving Chinese corporations also confirmed that Chinese investee 
companies in general did not understand the real value of sustainability very well but treated it 
as a marketing or publicity tool (SC, personal communications, 2 May, 2013). These 
characteristics were in stark contrast with Chinese branch offices belonging to international 
corporations. According to two interviewed organisations, sustainability was integrated in the 
group-level strategy by the headquarters and was subsequently implemented and monitored at 
different branch offices through various management systems (QM, personal 
communications, 25 April, 2013; SM, personal communications, 2 May, 2013). 
The Chinese companies surveyed and interviewed responded most strongly towards consumer 
or customer demand, regulations and opinion of stakeholders when considering implementing 
sustainability in their operations (see Question 7 in Appendix 3). A Chinese office of an 
international company revealed that apart from abiding by the ESG standards set by the 
headquarters and maintaining high ESG performance to retain staff, the branch office was 
also motivated to improve its ESG performance by customers who had specific ESG 
requirements. By fulfilling the relevant requirements, the company was able to secure business 
with them (QM, personal communications, 25 April, 2013). An interviewed engagement 
practitioner noticed that Chinese investee companies with overseas operations tended to be 
more attuned to ESG issues and the corresponding standards. This was because they needed 
to satisfy the standards of their potential foreign customers in order to secure work contracts 
(ESP2, personal communications, 10 April, 2013). Researchers also found that Chinese 
companies addressed ESG matters mainly because of regulatory requirement. An example was 
the publication of CSR or sustainability report, whose number soared after the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council as well as the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges had issued relevant reporting requirements 
(Baocheng Liu, personal communications, 9 April, 2013; Weihua Liu, personal 
communications, 23 April, 2013).  
The third set of questions explores how response options generated by investee companies are 
evaluated. The two Chinese investee companies surveyed selected almost all of the provided 
options under Question 7 (see Appendix 2), which asked them what factors they would 
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consider when addressing ESG issues. While the sample was obviously too limited to provide 
any conclusive results, the common factors selected by both of them might still give an 
indication of the relatively more important factors. Those items were relevant legal 
requirement and regulations, best practice within the foreign industry and the costs of 
necessary measures to address the identified ESG issues. Besides, both Chinese investee 
companies and engagement practitioners confirmed that it took time for Chinese investees to 
digest the ESG issues internally, create response options, evaluate them and finally make a 
decision. Considering that companies might have six to seven board meetings per year, an 
engagement practitioner’s experience was that it might take three to four board meetings or 
even a year for the company’s top management to digest and discuss the concerned ESG 
issues before they began to address them (II1, personal communications, 30 April, 2013). 
The fourth set of questions is on how the selected option is implemented by Chinese investee 
companies (Questions 8 & 9 in Appendix 3). In case the ESG issues raised by engagement 
practitioners were deemed by the investee companies as irrelevant, the two Chinese investee 
companies surveyed stated that they would reply the engagement practitioners that such issues 
were irrelevant with explanation. If the companies decided to address the identified ESG 
issues, setting goals and having a tracking mechanism in place were important to these two 
respondents. One respondent was also ready to hire external experts if needed. 
The final set of questions asks the Chinese investee companies to evaluate the subsequent 
financial and social performances of addressing ESG issues (Questions 10-12 in Appendix 3). 
One questionnaire respondent observed there was positive change in the company’s policy 
and financial performance. In particular, ESG performance compared to domestic industry, 
stakeholder satisfaction, overall operational costs and financial return etc. were improved. But 
the company was unable to reach through phone and email for an elaboration of such positive 
changes after submitting the questionnaire. The other respondent company said there had 
been no impact so far because the company was still in the process of evaluating the ESG 
issues internally and had not decided if further actions were needed yet (IRO2, personal 
communications, 29 April, 2013). For engagement practitioners that had set goals for the ESG 
engagement, the time needed to achieve successful engagement i.e. recording improvement in 
ESG performance of Chinese companies with Chinese investees varied from one year to 
beyond three years. One respondent mentioned some Chinese investee companies were very 
receptive to engagement and would implement minor improvements even after the first 
meeting, for example, translating their sustainability report into English and publishing the 
reports publicly. (ESP1, personal communications, 2 May, 2013). 
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5 ANALYSIS 
The thesis now turns to analyse the obtained data with reference to the synthesised analytical 
framework discussed in Section 3.1.3. Firstly, such a framework analyses the types of advocacy 
and inquiry processes and their subsequent level of collective sense-making on environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) engagement from the perspectives of engagement practitioners 
and Chinese investee companies. Secondly, it evaluates in greater depth Chinese investees’ 
organisational decision-making on engagement, which will help engagement practitioners to 
develop more effective engagement practices. 
5.1 Application & Limitation of the Collective Sense-making 
Categorisation 
Findings collected from the two sets of questionnaires and interviews in general confirm 
Zarbafi (2011)’s framework on collective sense-making. Activities classified as Shareholder 
Dialogue, such as face-to-face meetings, teleconference and company visit, have high levels of 
advocacy and enquiry. These were perceived by both of the engagement practitioners and 
Chinese investee companies to be the most effective in rendering an ‘Enhanced’ collective 
sense-making of ESG issues. Apart from advocating their own point of view, engagement 
practitioner’s inquiry into how Chinese investee companies understood ESG issues and why 
they chose to address them in the current manner demonstrated a genuine interest in and 
respect for the investees’ operations, their operating environment and perspectives. In short 
both parties were able to put their own sense-making of ESG issues on the table for 
discussion, and therefore contributing to an Enhanced collective sense-making. Such two-way 
communications were not only essential to allow investee companies to explain their 
worldview and therefore provide valuable feedback in the engagement process, but also build 
trust with the investee companies in the long run.  
However unlike what Zarbafi (2011)’s framework had predicted (or some engagement 
practitioners had thought), some Chinese investee companies found Screening, 
Questionnaires and Shareholder Activism types of advocacy and inquiry processes to be 
beneficial and informative as well. For example, although ESG questionnaires were 
categorised as low level of advocacy but a high level of inquiry, investee companies considered 
questions in these questionnaires were based on engagement practitioners’ expectation and 
benchmarks. In this sense, the engagement practitioners were therefore advocating certain 
ESG standards to them. Even an engagement practitioner who conducted questionnaires 
regularly with Chinese investee companies admitted that if the Chinese investees looked into 
the questionnaires, they would be able to infer, for which ESG agenda the practitioner was 
trying to push. Another example was proxy voting. Although it was classified as shareholder 
activism, a high-advocacy but low-inquiry engagement process, it had prompted some Chinese 
investee companies to initiate conversation with the engagement practitioners, explaining to 
the practitioners their approach to ESG issues. In other words, engagement practitioners were 
given the opportunity to inquire the investees’ situation, even though their original 
engagement activity was not designed for that. These observations do not fit precisely into 
Zarbafi’s collective sense-making categorisation that organises engagement activities according 
to their levels of advocacy and inquiry at the moment they are initiated by the engagement 
practitioners. Further explanations on the link between the observed active learning attitude 
and capacity among Chinese investee companies and the resulting types of collective sense-
making on ESG issues are required.  
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The thesis suggests that Chinese investee companies’ proactiveness is a crucial factor in 
determining the type of collective sense-making generated in the engagement process. Such a 
factor was not explicitly accounted for in Zarbafi (2011)’s original categorisation (recall Figure 
3-3) that paired each advocacy and inquiry process directly with the corresponding collective 
sense-making. Figure 5-1 redraws the original matrix into two columns of advocacy and 
inquiry process and collective sense-making. Each row of advocacy and inquiry process on the 
left leads to the corresponding type of collective sense-making on the right in the original 
categorisation method. The thesis’ collected data, however, shows that it may not be as linear 
as the original concept suggests. Chinese investee companies’ proactiveness that happens as a 
response to the advocacy and inquiry process will indeed affect the resulting type of collective 
sense-making.  
 
Figure 5-1 Chinese investee companies’ proactiveness in engagement process 
Moreover, a closer look at the responses by each of the engagement practitioners 
demonstrates that three types of practitioners with different approach to engagement and 
means of engagement can be concluded. Type 1 practitioners are those who emphasise the 
importance of establishing collective sense-making with Chinese investee companies in ESG 
engagement but do not carry out as many meetings as they have hoped for. The number of 
meetings is sometimes limited by their client investors’ demand, the availability of resources or 
political circumstances. Type 2 practitioners do not emphasise the importance of establishing 
collective sense-making with Chinese investees that much but at the same time are keen on 
using Shareholder Dialogue like meetings to engage with Chinese investee companies. Finally 
Type 3 practitioners explicitly strive for collective sense-making with Chinese investee 
companies and resorting to Shareholder Dialogues as the key means of engagement. Data 
shows that Type 3 practitioners seem to take shorter period of time to reach successful 
engagement than its Type 1 and 2 counterparts. Indeed it just took around one year for a Type 
1 practitioner to achieve this, the shortest indicated period of time among all respondents. It 
took on average two to three years and beyond three years for the Type 2 and Type 3 
practitioners respectively. Table 5 summarises such findings. 
Table 5 Three types of engagement practitioners 
 Emphasis on 
Establishing Collective 
Sense-making 
Use of Shareholder  
Dialogues 
Time needed to Achieve  
Successful Engagement 
Type 1 practitioner   Longer 
Type 2 practitioner   Longer 
Type 3 practitioner   Shorter 
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The thesis therefore proposes that using activities classified as Shareholder Dialogue or 
emphasising the importance of collective sense-making alone will not necessarily shorten the 
time needed for engagement or produce desirable engagement outcome. Engagement 
practitioners’ underlying aim to generate collective sense-making and the means of 
engagement need to be aligned in order to maximise the level of the collective sense-making 
with Chinese investees. While Zarbafi (2011)’s categorisation assumes that engagement 
practitioners’ approach and selected means of engagement are inherently aligned in theory, the 
thesis’ data shows that it may not be the case all the time. One possible explanation is that 
meetings or site visits can potentially be transformed from being a Shareholder Dialogue into 
a high-advocacy but low-inquiry medium of communication if the engagement practitioner 
does not seek to understand the investee companies’ view on ESG issues and the reasons of 
their current ESG-related work, or to explain clearly the aim of engagement in a meeting. This 
is because engagement practitioner’s underlying approach to engagement will undeniably 
direct how a meeting is conducted. Furthermore, an engagement practitioner who highly 
values the importance of establishing collective sense-making on ESG issues with the investee 
companies may not be able to demonstrate this if it does not or is unable to use Shareholder 
Dialogue in engagement. The thesis would like to suggest that analysing an engagement 
practitioner’s approach to engagement in addition to the means of engagement shall add value 
to Zarbafi (2011)’s original categorisation in predicting the types of resulting collective sense-
making more precisely.  
5.2 Characteristics of Chinese Investees’ Response to Engagement 
After analysing the collected data with reference to the collective sense-making categorisation, 
this section will turn to examine how the data gathered based on Margolis and Walsh (2003)’s 
descriptive research approach can provide further insights into the key characteristics of 
Chinese investees companies when responding to ESG engagement. This shall help 
engagement practitioners understand better what they should do during the selected advocacy 
and inquiry process so as to maximise the level of collective sense-making. The key 
characteristics are: 
1. limited understanding and low awareness of concepts including ESG, CSR and 
responsible investment; 
2. lack of top management support for ESG issues;  
3. unique presence of state or family as majority shareholders, and; 
4. regulatory requirement and customer demand as the biggest motivating factors to 
address ESG issues.  
As confirmed by various participants of the study including engagement practitioners, 
academics and sustainability consultant, the lack of understanding in ESG-related concepts 
poses great challenges for stakeholders to motivate the Chinese investee companies to 
improve their ESG performance. The situation is worsened when much of the top 
management fail to see the intrinsic values of minimising and raising one’s ESG risks and 
preparedness respectively because Chinese companies in general are relatively more 
hierarchical, exhibiting a top-down management approach. To further complicate the picture, 
many of the biggest listed corporations in China are indeed held in the hands of the Chinese 
government or wealthy families. Such a shareholding structure presents another layer of 
challenge for institutional investors to engage with the companies. This is particularly so if the 
investees’ operations with questionable ESG standards are in line with the state’s national 
policy or goals. What the investee companies fail to see is that financial backing from the 
government or wealthy families does not mean they can operate outside of the greater 
environmental, social and economic contexts (recall Figure 1-1). The problem of negative 
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externalities discussed in Chapter 2 still applies to them. Chinese investee companies who do 
respond more positively to ESG issues are likely to be driven by legislation and customer 
demand. While the government and customers are of course two of the key stakeholders to 
any company, Chinese investees who do not attempt to expand their horizon of ESG issues 
and seek other stakeholders’ perspectives will remain rather passive in improving their ESG 
performance in the long run.  
All of these four characteristics are not only a major road block for Chinese investee 
companies to continue their journey towards sustainability, but also to compete with other 
emerging markets. Some respondents did mention other South East Asian countries such as 
Thailand were displaying very promising ESG improvements and responsiveness to investors’ 
engagement efforts. 
Understanding the characteristics of Chinese investee companies regarding ESG issues will 
help engagement practitioners adjust what they should do during the advocacy and inquiry 
process. For example, the thesis’ analysis has thus far supported the collective sense-making 
categorisation that Shareholder Dialogue such as face-to-face meetings is the most effective in 
making sense of ESG issues collectively by the engagement practitioners and Chinese investee 
companies. But the next question is: what can engagement practitioners do in the meetings to 
better harness such mutual understanding?  
The thesis proposes that engagement practitioners can attract Chinese investees’ attention and 
interests in ESG issues by highlighting the trends of domestic and international regulatory 
requirement and consumers’ perspectives on such issues. These, however, should be treated as 
the opening of meaningful ESG discussions that shall gradually move beyond such 
‘immediate’ values of addressing ESG issues and expand to cover the intrinsic values of 
having high ESG preparedness while minimising ESG risks. In particular, engagement 
practitioners may seek to invite top management of the main business operations, apart from 
the investor relations officer or company secretary, to such meetings. If the investee company 
concerned is a state-owned enterprise or has majority family shareholder, engagement 
practitioners may attempt to conduct collaborative engagement with other institutional 
investors, where possible. Joining hands with other engagement practitioners who share the 
same concern for ESG issues will make a ‘louder voice’ to grasp the investee companies’ 
attention, especially those that are used to ignore ESG engagement due to their strong 
financial backing from their majority shareholders. 
5.3 Reflection on Methodology 
Reflecting on the methodology employed by the thesis, the relatively low response rates by 
Chinese investee companies in general might have been contributed by the fact that 
questionnaires were used as the primary data collection tool. Although the thesis’ research 
design has basically followed recommendations by previous studies done with Chinese 
companies, such as establishing phone contact before sending the questionnaires, the 
anticipated response rates were still much overestimated. This can possibly be improved by 
calling all of the 117 Chinese investees in the sample instead of the current practice of calling 
those with ESG disclosure in sustainability reports or on website only, if time allows. An 
alternative is to replace the questionnaires for Chinese investee companies with interviews or 
even focus group discussions. After all, research respondents of this thesis have stated the 
phenomenon of ‘questionnaire fatigue’ among investee companies. And as Chinese companies 
value guanxi or relationship in Mandarin highly, the interactions and personal aspect of 
interviews may be a more useful medium to collect data. In addition, some of the questions 
developed based on Margolis and Walsh (2003)’s descriptive research agenda are rather 
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specific. An interview or discussion will allow the invited companies to ask questions about the 
questions and the author to provide explanation, which may encourage them to provide 
responses. 
Overall the results can only represent the data collected and are not very generalisable. This is 
mainly because of the lack of direct feedback from Chinese investee companies. Much part of 
the data on Chinese investees is from experts or researchers who are experienced with China 
and Chinese companies. While they have provided valuable information on the topic, they can 
only represent what they think about how Chinese companies think and act. Therefore their 
perspective is essentially an impression of the Chinese companies, which may have 
discrepancy with reality.  
For the engagement practitioners, one of the focus topics explored in this thesis is what they 
think about collective sense-making with Chinese investee companies. The method used was 
to ask them to select those statements on collective sense-making that they identified with in 
the questionnaire. As there is no widely accepted approach on collective sense-making in ESG 
engagement yet, these statements were drafted based on the author’s own interpretation of 
Zarbafi (2011)’s framework as well as her work experience in engagement obtained through 
the internship. Engagement practitioners may have a different understanding on how 
collective sense-making should be defined, which has not been explored in depth in this 
research. As such, a change of those statements may result in different selections by the 
responding practitioners, which will in turn affect the analysis and results of this research. 
5.4 Summary 
In sum, this chapter has presented the data analysis with reference to the research approaches 
of inter-organisational collective sense-making and organisational decision-making. Figure 5-2 
summarises such analysis into a conceptual model that describes the key elements affecting 
the level of collective sense-making on ESG issues in engagement.  
First of all, with reference to Figure 5-2 and to maximise the level of collective sense-making 
of ESG issues, engagement practitioners need to fully understand and acknowledge the role 
collective sense-making plays in achieving more desirable engagement outcomes. The 
approach to engagement should not be just about advocacy but also inquiry. A balanced 
advocacy and inquiry approach is indispensable to building long-term trust in a stable 
relationship with Chinese investees. Such a sense of mutual understanding will pave way for 
both of the engagement practitioners and the investee companies to look for ways to improve 
the companies’ ESG performance.  
Secondly, advocacy and inquiry process needs to be aligned with this underlying approach to 
engagement. It is true that engagement practitioners always need to decide which advocacy 
and inquiry processes are the most cost-effective, given their limited resources. But as 
Shareholder Dialogue aligns the best with the aim to generate collective sense-making, priority 
should be given to this type of advocacy and inquiry process. Also, the actual implementation 
of Shareholder Dialogue should be guided by the understanding of Chinese investee 
companies’ characteristics of addressing ESG issues. Once the advocacy and inquiry process is 
delivered, Chinese investee companies’ own level of proactiveness towards ESG issues is the 
final variable in generating the resulting collective sense-making. This is important to consider 
because despite the presence of general characteristics of Chinese investees, some of the 
investees are indeed more proactive than others when it comes to addressing ESG concerns. 
Their proactive attitude can even improve the ‘Minimal’ collective sense-making generated by 
the Screening type of advocacy and inquiry process.  
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In sum, the combination of an appropriate approach to engagement, use of Shareholder 
Dialogue guided by the consideration of Chinese investees’ characteristics and a relatively high 
level of proactiveness of the investees will produce the maximum level of collective sense-
making of ESG issues. This will more likely result in positive changes in Chinese investee 
companies’ ESG preparedness. 
 
Figure 5-2 Proposed model on ESG engagement and collective sense-making 
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6 Conclusions & Recommendations 
The thesis has explored the process of engagement on environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) issues between engagement practitioners (including institutional investors and their 
engagement representatives) and Chinese investee companies, with the aim to identify and 
understand the current practices, as well as to make recommendations to enhance the process. 
This particularly addresses the current knowledge gap on how ESG engagement is conducted 
in the Chinese contexts and how Chinese investees perceive engagement, a particular piece of 
information lacked by engagement practitioners to further improve their work. Two research 
questions with a few sub-questions were developed based on the normative inter-
organisational sense-making research agenda and the descriptive organisational decision-
making research agenda (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Zarbafi, 2011): 
RQ1:  How do engagement practitioners interact with Chinese investee companies? 
 What are the common practices in the Chinese context? 
 Why do engagement practitioners opt for such practices? 
RQ2:  How do Chinese investee companies perceive the engagement services they have received? 
 What are the common engagement services received? 
 How do Chinese investee companies make sense of such services? 
 How do Chinese investee companies decide what they should do regarding 
such services? 
The thesis has found that a wide range of tools are employed by engagement practitioners but 
most respondents agree that Shareholder Dialogues, e.g. face-to-face meetings, teleconference 
and company or site visits are the most effective ways of communications. The selection of 
engagement tools depends on the practitioners’ approach to engagement and availability of 
resources.  
The surveyed and/or interviewed Chinese investee companies have also been engaged by the 
practitioners on ESG issues via various means. Same as the practitioners, most investee 
respondents found that Shareholder Dialogue is the most effective way to understand 
investors’ expectations on ESG matters. Surprisingly some surveyed companies have indicated 
that the Screening, Questionnaires and Shareholder Activism types of engagement activities 
are quite useful and informative as well.  
With regards to Chinese investees’ response to ESG engagement, it has been found that in 
general they have a relative low awareness and limited understanding on ESG-related concepts 
and lack top-management support in addressing ESG matters strategically. Many are backed 
financially by the state or wealthy family shareholders. They are primarily motivated by client 
demand and regulations to address ESG issues.  
Analysis of the collected data has contributed to a deeper understanding of the application 
and limitation of the chosen analytical framework. First of all, this thesis partly confirms the 
collective sense-making categorisation by Zarbafi (2011) that Shareholder Dialogue is the 
most desired advocacy and inquiry process perceived by both of the engagement practitioners 
and Chinese investee companies. However it has revealed that other factors may also affect 
the level of collective sense-making of ESG issues. Firstly, investees’ higher level of 
proactiveness to addressing ESG issues may result in better collective sense-making. The 
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second factor is the alignment of the engagement practitioners’ approach to and their means 
of engagement with an explicit aim to generate collective sense-making. Such an alignment 
seems to contribute to more desirable engagement outcomes. Also, with reference to Margolis 
and Walsh (2003)’s research approach on organisational decision-making, the thesis has 
suggested that an understanding of the characteristics of Chinese investees when responding 
to ESG engagement shall help guide engagement practitioners to execute engagement more 
effectively.  
Based on the above findings and analysis, the thesis has proposed an alternative model that 
describes how to achieve the maximum level of collective sense-making on ESG issues shared 
by the engagement practitioners and Chinese investees, which will increase the chance of 
successfully motivating the investee companies to improve their ESG performance. Such a 
model requires the engagement practitioner to adjust their engagement approach to include a 
clear aim of generating collective sense-making with Chinese investees, prioritise its resouces 
to use Shareholder Dialogue in engagement and mindfully consider the characteristics 
displayed by Chinese investees during the engagement process. And if the Chinese investee 
company being engaged is highly proactive towards ESG matters, a relatively higher level of 
collective sense-making will be generated.  
 
With this alternative model in mind, the thesis will conclude with a list of recommendations 
for different stakeholders below.  
6.1 Engagement Practitioners 
Engagement approach: Being able to make sense of ESG issues collectively with Chinese 
investee companies is essential to maximise engagement impact. Practitioners should 
understand the importance of collective sense-making and adjust their existing engagement 
approach to include an explicit aim to generate collective sense-making with Chinese investees 
on ESG matters. Subsequent engagement tools and activities should be aligned with the 
underlying approach and aim.  
Engagement tool and activity: Shareholder Dialogue including, for example face-to-face 
meetings, company or site visits and teleconference, is the most effective type of engagement 
tool to assist practitioners to implement their approach to allow the exchange of ideas and 
therefore maximise collective sense-making with Chinese investee companies. Priority should 
be given to these tools. 
At the same time engagement practitioners should avoid using questionnaires as the primary 
tool to access companies’ ESG information but rely more on publicly available data or well-
established third-party databases (e.g. Carbon Disclosure Project) and encourage Chinese 
investee companies to disclose their non-financial data. The thesis suggests that a higher level 
of collective sense-making may be generated by the use of Questionnaires when the Chinese 
investee companies involved are more proactive on the ESG agenda. However, if these 
companies are already proactive, shouldn’t engagement practitioner strive to maximise the 
potential collective sense-making by using the more desirable advocacy and inquiry process of 
Shareholder Dialogue? Besides, avoiding questionnaires can help minimise investees’ 
frustration about ‘questionnaire fatigue’ and let them have more time and resources to develop 
their own sustainability reports.  
Collaborative engagement can be an effective way to help Chinese investee companies, 
especially those with the state or families as the majority shareholder, to understand the ESG 
implications of their operations. While such investees tend to pay less attention to investors’ 
concern on thier ESG risks and preparedness, collaborative engagement shall pull engagement 
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practitioners’ power of influence together to better motivate investees to address certain ESG 
issues properly. 
Engagement practitioners should try not to conduct ESG engagement activities only when 
there is an ESG-related incident or high ESG risks are confirmed. They should manage 
engagement as an ongoing process to build trust between two parties. For example, they may 
consider communicating with investees for their positive ESG developments or efforts in 
minimising ESG risks by issuing letters to investor relations department and the top 
management. Such engagement effort requires relatively less input from the engagement 
practitioners, who are usually bounded by their limited time and resources and therefore tend 
to engage with companies with greater ESG risks only. This also communicates a strong 
message to the investee companies that the engagement practitioners are not an ‘ESG cop’ 
who only appears on the scene when there are risks. Instead they have a genuine interest in 
the ESG development of the investee companies. Moreover it enables direct communication 
with the top management, further motivating them to integrate sustainability into operations. 
Awareness Raising: Engagement practitioners need to continue to educate Chinese investee 
companies, particularly the top and senior management, on ESG-related concepts. With top 
management’s buying-in, ESG considerations are more likely to be integrated strategically into 
the company’s operations, and hence delivering added values to the companies instead of 
being a ‘green wash’ or a public relations tool. Concepts that need to be promoted are 
responsible investment (e.g. how investors are using this as an investment strategy and why), 
ESG (e.g. how relevant they are to a company’s risk management and hence long-term 
performance) and corporate social responsibility or CSR (e.g. it is not just about corporate 
philanthropy but a way of managing one’s business).  Highlighting the added values by sound 
ESG management will likely grasp the attention of top management, who seem to be more 
attuned to the business case of ESG issues. 
6.2 Chinese Investees 
Comprehensive Disclosure: Proper disclosure on the company’s financials as well as 
sustainability information provides the first and key step for a meaningful dialogue with 
investors, which in addition will trigger a positive cycle in investor relations. With better 
disclosure, the likelihood for engagement practitioners to use specially-designed questionnaire 
or other inquiry tools to gather basic ESG data will become less. As such, both of the 
engagement practitioners and Chinese investee companies can allocate more of their time and 
resources on shareholder dialogue such as meetings that are more effective in producing a 
higher level of collective sense-making. Besides, public disclosure enhances the degree of 
accountability among the investees, which will motivate them to take responsibility of their 
disclosure and on the other help build trust with engagement practitioners. Trust is a key 
building block for successful engagement. 
Sound Communication System: Engagement effort can be severely undermined if Chinese 
investee companies are out of reach by the engagement practitioners. This can easily be 
remedied by making sure the contact emails and phone numbers posed on websites actually 
work and are maintained by dedicated personnel properly. As simple and straightforward as 
this may sound, a lot of Chinese investees have overlooked these basics, hindering 
engagement practitioners from making meaningful contacts with them. 
Be a Learning Organisation: This is a general management philosophy but it certainly helps 
Chinese investee companies in a time when responsible investment is gaining weight in the 
market. Many of the largest Chinese corporations are indeed listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
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Exchange, which is essentially a free market attracting international institutional investors who 
are in general more adept to responsible investment. Thus a better understanding of 
responsible investment and ESG issues will surely give these Chinese companies an edge over 
others in the long run. Chinese investee companies have come so far since the opening up of 
the economy in the 1980s. A proactive learning attitude, particularly with reference to ESG 
issues, will help those investees that have championed in the decades of economic transition 
to become even more competitive and resilient in a new era. 
6.3 Policymakers 
Country Competitiveness: Chinese policymakers can consider increasing the country’s 
competitiveness through responsible investment. Many institutional investors in the study 
viewed emerging markets, including China, are exposed to high ESG risks. Better ESG 
preparedness is deemed by investors as an attractive investment environment. If the Chinese 
government would like to attract more foreign capital to invest in its market instead of other 
emerging markets, helping companies to better understand responsible investment and ESG 
issues will be very important. The following presents a few examples Chinese policymakers 
can consider: 
 Fund or conduct studies on topics such as mainstreaming responsible investment in 
China, engaging with state-owned enterprises etc. 
 Raise awareness on good sustainability reporting: Although sustainability reporting is 
compulsory for certain companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen already, the quality 
of reporting varies. Policymakers can engage with Chinese companies to understand 
what the obstacles for companies to produce quality reports and provide the necessary 
aid along the way. 
 Enhance the domestic demand for responsible investment: Pension funds are usually 
regarded as the major client for responsible investment. The Chinese government can 
explore how similar funds in China can play a role in facilitating the development of 
responsible investment. 
6.4 Academics 
Future Research Directions: Academics may contribute to the development of ESG 
engagement through various research directions. The first one is to repeat similar research as 
this thesis but with a larger sample size of Chinese investee companies. The thesis’ 
conclusions can only reflect the views of limited number of Chinese investees surveyed and 
interviewed, and more direct feedback from Chinese investees is needed to produce more 
generalisable and conclusive results.  Another research direction is to focus on successful 
business case and proven business value of Chinese investee companies in enhancing their 
ESG preparedness. While the current thesis has briefly touched upon these topics but is 
unable to render more in-depth data within the research scope and the company sample size, 
future researchers can explore more specifically such business cases. Findings will interest 
both of the engagement practitioners and investee companies as the former can use the 
business case to encourage investees to adopt a higher ESG standards while the latter will 
understand the relevance between better ESG preparedness and the company’s operational 
performance. Finally the thesis suggests researchers to carry out longitudinal studies to track 
Chinese investees’ ongoing experience with engagement and the subsequent impact of 
engagement in depth. A longitudinal profile will provide a more contextualised understanding 
of how Chinese investees think about and react upon interactions with engagement 
practitioners. 
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Appendix 1: Principles for Responsible Investment 
Source: UN PRI Website  
(Retrieved on 8 January 2013 from http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/the-six-principles/) 
 
Principle 1:  We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making 
processes. Possible actions: 
 Address ESG issues in investment policy statements 
 Support development of ESG-related tools, metrics, and analyses 
 Assess the capabilities of internal investment managers to incorporate ESG issues 
 Assess the capabilities of external investment managers to incorporate ESG 
issues 
 Ask investment service providers (such as financial analysts, consultants, brokers, 
research firms, or rating companies) to integrate ESG factors into evolving 
research and analysis 
 Encourage academic and other research on this theme 
 Advocate ESG training for investment professionals 
 
Principle 2: We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies 
and practices. Possible actions:  
 Develop and disclose an active ownership policy consistent with the Principles 
 Exercise voting rights or monitor compliance with voting policy (if outsourced) 
 Develop an engagement capability (either directly or through outsourcing) 
 Participate in the development of policy, regulation, and standard setting (such as 
promoting and protecting shareholder rights) 
 File shareholder resolutions consistent with long-term ESG considerations 
 Engage with companies on ESG issues 
 Participate in collaborative engagement initiatives 
 Ask investment managers to undertake and report on ESG-related engagement 
 
Principle 3: We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest. 
Possible actions: 
 Ask for standardised reporting on ESG issues (using tools such as the Global 
Reporting Initiative) 
 Ask for ESG issues to be integrated within annual financial reports 
 Ask for information from companies regarding adoption of/adherence to 
relevant norms, standards, codes of conduct or international initiatives (such as 
the UN Global Compact) 
 Support shareholder initiatives and resolutions promoting ESG disclosure 
 
Principle 4: We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the 
investment industry. Possible actions: 
 Include Principles-related requirements in requests for proposals (RFPs) 
 Align investment mandates, monitoring procedures, performance indicators and 
incentive structures accordingly (for example, ensure investment management 
processes reflect long-term time horizons when appropriate) 
 Communicate ESG expectations to investment service providers 
 Revisit relationships with service providers that fail to meet ESG expectations 
 Support the development of tools for benchmarking ESG integration 
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 Support regulatory or policy developments that enable implementation of the 
Principles 
 
Principle 5: We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles. 
Possible actions: 
 Support/participate in networks and information platforms to share tools, pool 
resources, and make use of investor reporting as a source of learning 
 Collectively address relevant emerging issues 
 Develop or support appropriate collaborative initiatives 
 
Principle 6:  We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the 
Principles. Possible actions: 
 Disclose how ESG issues are integrated within investment practices 
 Disclose active ownership activities (voting, engagement, and/or policy dialogue) 
 Disclose what is required from service providers in relation to the Principles 
 Communicate with beneficiaries about ESG issues and the Principles 
 Report on progress and/or achievements relating to the Principles using a 
‘Comply or Explain’1 approach 
 Seek to determine the impact of the Principles 
 Make use of reporting to raise awareness among a broader group of stakeholders 
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Appendix 2: Informed Consent Form & Questionnaire for 
Engagement Practitioners 
 
Introduction 
This research study is being conducted by Ms. Kei Yau Sin, master candidate at Lund University, 
Sweden to investigate how to improve engagement with investee companies in China, in order to 
further strengthen the business case of responsible investment.  
 
Procedures 
You will be asked to complete a questionnaire. The questionnaire consists of 20 questions and will 
take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Questions will include details of your organisation’s 
experience in interacting with Chinese investee companies on environmental, social and governance 
issues. After the submission of questionnaire, you may be contacted by the researcher to clarify and 
provide a more detailed account of certain answers in short phone interviews.  
 
Risks 
We do not anticipate any particular risks to your participation in this research. For concerns related 
to information security, please refer to the section Confidentiality below.  
 
Benefits/Compensation 
There is no direct compensation to participants of the questionnaire and interview. However, it is 
envisioned that your participation will help the researcher understand the current practices and 
challenges of engaging with Chinese investee companies on environmental, social and governance 
issues. As such, recommendations on how to improve such practices will be an outcome of the 
research. All participants will receive a copy of the final version of the thesis, around the fall of 2013. 
 
Confidentiality 
All information provided will be coded, kept anonymous and confidential. It will mostly be reported 
as aggregate data with no identifying information. If individual comment or information is 
mentioned, it will be done anonymously as well. All data will be password protected, kept in a secure 
location and only the researcher will have access to them. After the research is completed, the master 
list containing the coding information and data links will be destroyed. 
 
Participation 
Participation in this research study is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at any time or refuse 
to participate entirely. However, if the withdrawal of consent occurs at the time when it affects the 
possibility of the finalisation of the research (for instance, shortly before publication or thesis 
defense), the withdrawal should result only in the deletion of all personally identifiable data of the 
participant both in published materials and in stored and processed research data.  
 
Questions about the Research  
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Ms. Kei Yau Sin at 
kei_yau.sin.577@student.lu.se. 
 
Declaration of Consent 
We have read and understood the above information. We consent to take part in this research 
voluntarily. 
Organisation Name: Click here to enter text. 
Date: Click here to enter a date. 
Researcher Name: Click here to enter text. 
Date: Click here to enter a date. 
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Part 1: Contact Information* 
 
Contact person: Click here to enter text. 
Title: Click here to enter text. 
Department: Click here to enter text. 
Phone Number: (Country code) Phone No. 
E-Mail: Click here to enter text. 
 
* Contact details are only for short follow-up interviews, if needed.  
All contact information will be kept anonymous and confidential throughout research. 
 
Part 2: Organisational Support to Conduct Engagement in China 
 
1. How do you identify your organisation? 
 
☐ Institutional investor (including asset owners and/or portfolio managers) 
☐ Engagement advisory (Please go to Question 5 directly) 
  
2. How do you engage with investee companies in China on environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) issues? 
 
☐ By internal personnel only (Please go to Question 3, and then Question 5 directly) 
☐ By external engagement advisory only (Please go to Question 4, and then Question 5 directly) 
☐ Both, depending on the situation (Please answer Question 3 and Question 4, and continue) 
 
3. Following Question 0, why do you opt for “By internal personnel”?  
You may choose more than one answer. 
 
☐ Dedicated in-house professionals on ESG engagement are available 
☐ Dedicated in-house professionals on the China market are available 
☐ Limited budget availability 
☐ Concerns for information security 
☐ To build up internal capacity to incorporate ESG considerations into traditional portfolio 
management 
☐ Others (Please specify): Click here to enter text. 
 
4. Following Question 0, why do you opt for “By external engagement advisory”?  
You may choose more than an answer. 
 
☐ Lack of in-house professionals on ESG engagement 
☐ Lack of in-house professionals on the China market 
☐ Budget availability 
☐ Others (Please specify): Click here to enter text. 
Part 3: Engagement with Chinese Investee Companies 
 
5. Please select the statement(s) below that describes your organisation’s approach to ESG-related 
engagement. You may choose more than one answer. 
   
☐ Ongoing monitoring of investee companies’ ESG risks and preparedness 
☐ ESG engagement is a key step to realise active ownership 
☐ ESG engagement is carefully documented and reported to stakeholders 
☐ ESG engagement aims to improve investee companies’ ESG performance 
☐ Investee companies are inquired how they understand ESG issues 
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☐ Investee companies are inquired why they address ESG issues the way they do 
☐ ESG engagement actions are always clearly explained to investee companies 
 
6. From your organisation’s experience, please rate the level of relevance of the following ESG 
issues that require engagement with Chinese investee companies on a scale of 1 – 5.  
 
 Highly 
irrelevant 
Somewhat 
irrelevant 
Neutral Somewhat 
relevant 
Highly 
relevant 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Environmental risk ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Labour and human rights issues ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Community outreach ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Transparency and reporting ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Corporate governance ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
7. From your organisation’s experience, please rate the level of difficulty to engage with Chinese 
investee companies in terms of the following ESG issues on a scale of 1 – 5.  
 
 Highly 
easy 
Somewhat 
easy 
Neutral Somewhat 
difficult 
Highly 
difficult 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Environmental risk ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Labour and human rights issues ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Community outreach ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Transparency and reporting ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Corporate governance ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
8. Which of the following has your organisation conducted with Chinese investee companies 
before? You may choose more than one answer. 
 
☐ ESG evaluation and screening of investee companies based on publicly available information 
☐ Thematic ESG research on an ad hoc or regular basis (e.g. industry-wide study) 
☐ ESG questionnaires to investee companies 
☐ Reports on ESG rating to investee companies 
☐ Reports on ESG recommendations to investee companies 
☐ Letter on specific ESG concerns to investee companies issued by one or more investors 
☐ Request for progress reports and documentation on the handling of identified ESG issues 
☐ Face-to-face meetings or teleconference to discuss ESG issues 
☐ Company or site visits 
☐ Filing of shareholder resolutions 
☐ Proxy voting with explanation 
☐ Collaborative engagement by more than one investor 
☐ Divestment or recommendation for it, with explanation 
☐ Others (Please specify): Click here to enter text. 
 
9. In 2012, how many Chinese investee companies did your organisation engage with in total? 
Click here to enter text. 
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10. In 2012, how many of the following did your organisation conduct with Chinese investee 
companies in total? Please skip the items that are not applicable to your organisation. 
 
 Number of occurrence 
ESG evaluation and screening of investee companies based on  
publicly available information 
Click here to enter text. 
ESG questionnaires to investee companies Click here to enter text. 
Proxy voting with explanation Click here to enter text. 
Face-to-face meetings with investee companies Click here to enter text. 
 
11. Please rate the level of difficulty to reach Chinese investee companies through the following 
channels on a scale of 1 – 5. Please skip the items that are not applicable to your organisation. 
 
 Highly 
easy 
Somewhat 
easy 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
difficult 
Highly 
difficult 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Electronic mail ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Postal mail ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Facsimile ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Telephone calls and/or teleconference ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Face-to-face meetings ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Company and/or site visit ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Others (Please specify):  
Click here to enter text. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
12. Compared to other emerging markets#, please rate the level of difficulty to conduct engagement 
with investee companies in China on average on a scale of 1 – 3. 
 
 Easier than  
average 
Average More difficult 
than average 
 1 2 3 
Level of difficulty to conduct engagement 
with Chinese investee companies 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
#
Emerging market countries based on MSCI definition (exclusive of China): Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey 
 
13. Following Question 12, please rate the performance of China, as compared to other emerging 
markets with regards to the following statements on a scale of 1 – 3. 
 
 Worse than 
Average 
1 
Average 
 
2 
Better than average 
3 
Understanding of responsible investment by 
companies 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
Understanding of ESG issues by companies ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Responsiveness to ESG issues by companies ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Transparency of business and ESG reporting ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Regulations regarding ESG issues ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Enforcement of regulations regarding ESG ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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issues 
Language barrier and other cultural 
differences 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
14. Following Questions 13, please write down other differences between China and other emerging 
markets with regards to ESG-related engagement below, if any. 
Click here to enter text. 
 
Part 4: Impact of Engagement with Chinese Investee Companies 
 
15. Does your organisation set goals for each engagement with Chinese investee companies? 
 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
 
16. How does your organisation track the progress of such engagement? 
 
☐ Regular meetings or teleconferences 
☐ Regular company or site visits 
☐ Request for proof or documentation on the handling of identified ESG issues  
☐ Verification with relevant government or official agencies 
☐ Verification with non-governmental organisations  
☐ Others (Please specify): Click here to enter text. 
 
17. Based on your organisation’s experience, how long does it take to reach successful engagement 
with Chinese investee companies on average? 
 
☐ 0 – 1 year 
☐ 1 – 2 years 
☐ 2 – 3 years 
☐ Beyond 3 years  
 
18. On average, does it take longer for your organisation to reach successful engagement with 
investee companies in China than those in other emerging markets? 
 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
 
19. On average, is it more common for your organisation to exercise or advise divestment as a 
responsible investment strategy in China than in other emerging markets? 
 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
 
Part 5: Other Comments 
 
20. If you have other comments regarding engagement with Chinese investee companies, which are 
not covered by any of the above questions, please indicate them below. 
Click here to enter text. 
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End of Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for your participation. Please save and send the completed questionnaire to 
kei_yau.sin.577@student.lu.se. You will receive a copy of the Informed Consent Form completed by the 
researcher shortly upon your submission. Your company may be contacted by the researcher, Ms. 
Kei Yau Sin, to clarify or provide a more detailed account of the answers, if needed. If you have 
further questions regarding this research, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher at 
kei_yau.sin.577@student.lu.se.  
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Appendix 3: Informed Consent Form & Questionnaire for 
Chinese Investee Companies 
 
Introduction 
This research study is being conducted by Ms. Kei Yau Sin, master candidate at Lund University, 
Sweden to investigate how to improve engagement with investee companies in China, in order to 
further strengthen the business case of responsible investment.  
 
Procedures 
You will be asked to complete a questionnaire. The questionnaire consists of 17 questions and will 
take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Questions will include details of your company’s 
experience in interacting with institutional investors or engagement advisories hired by them with 
regards to environmental, social and governance issues. After the submission of questionnaire, you 
may be contacted by the researcher to clarify and provide a more detailed account of certain answers 
in short phone interviews.  
 
Risks 
We do not anticipate any particular risks to your participation in this research. For concerns related 
to information security, please refer to the section Confidentiality below.  
 
Benefits/Compensation 
There is no direct compensation to participants of the questionnaire and interview. However, it is 
envisioned that your participation will help the researcher understand how Chinese investee 
companies perceive environmental, social and governance issues, as well as investee engagement 
guided bythe concept of responsible investment. As such, recommendations on how to improve 
engagement practices will be an outcome of the research. All participants will receive a copy of the 
final version of the thesis, around the fall of 2013. 
 
Confidentiality 
All information provided will be coded, kept anonymous and confidential. It will mostly be reported 
as aggregate data with no identifying information. If individual comment or information is 
mentioned, it will be done anonymously as well. All data will be password protected, kept in a secure 
location and only the researcher will have access to them. After the research is completed, the master 
list containing the coding information and data links will be destroyed. 
 
Participation 
Participation in this research study is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at any time or refuse 
to participate entirely. However, if the withdrawal of consent occurs at the time when it affects the 
possibility of the finalisation of the research (for instance, shortly before publication or thesis 
defense), the withdrawal should result only in the deletion of all personally identifiable data of the 
participant both in published materials and in stored and processed research data. 
 
Questions about the Research  
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Ms. Kei Yau Sin at 
kei_yau.sin.577@student.lu.se. 
 
Declaration of Consent 
We have read and understood the above information. We consent to take part in this research 
voluntarily. 
Company Name: Click here to enter text.  Researcher Name: Click here to enter text. 
Date: Click here to enter a date.    Date: Click here to enter a date. 
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Part 1: Contact Information* 
 
Contact person: Click here to enter text. 
Title: Click here to enter text. 
Department: Click here to enter text. 
Phone Number: (Country code) Phone No. 
E-Mail: Click here to enter text. 
 
* Contact details are only for short follow-up interviews, if needed.  
All contact information will be kept anonymous and confidential throughout research. 
  
Part 2: Onset of Engagement Process 
 
1. Have your company received engagement on environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues# from the following parties? 
 
☐ Institutional investors (including asset owners and managers) 
☐ Engagement advisories representing the institutional investors  
(hereafter, engagement representatives) 
☐ Both of the above 
 
#Engagement on ESG issues refers to institutional investors’ effort to monitor the investee companies’ ESG 
risks and preparedness and continuously motivate them to make improvements through dialogues. This may be 
done by the investors themselves or via external engagement advisories representing the investors. 
  
2. Which of the following ESG issues have your institutional investors or their engagement 
representatives raised to your company? You may choose more than one answer. 
 
☐ Environmental risks ☐ Transparency and reporting 
☐ Labour and human rights issues ☐ Corporate governance 
☐ Community outreach 
 
☐ Others (Please specify):  
Click here to enter text. 
3. In 2012, how many institutional investors or their engagement representatives contacted your 
company to discuss ESG issues?  
Click here to enter text. 
 
4. Below is a list of common practices conducted by institutional investors or their engagement 
representatives. Please indicate how frequently your company receives them on average. 
 
 Never 
receive 
before 
Less than 
once per 
year 
Once per 
year 
2 -3 times 
per year 
4 - 5 times 
per year 
Beyond 5 
times per 
year 
ESG evaluation and screening of 
your company based on publicly 
available information 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Thematic ESG research on an 
ad hoc or regular basis 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
ESG questionnaires to 
your company 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Reports on ESG rating of  
your company 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Reports on ESG recommendations 
for your company 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Letter from one or more investors 
sharing specific ESG concerns 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Never 
receive 
before 
Less than 
once per 
year 
Once per 
year 
2 -3 times 
per year 
4 - 5 times 
per year 
Beyond 5 
times per 
year 
Request for proof or 
documentation on the handling of 
identified ESG issues 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Face-to-face meetings or 
teleconference to discuss ESG 
issues 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Submission of shareholder 
resolutions 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Proxy voting with explanation ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Collaborative engagement from 
more than one investors 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Divestment or the 
recommendation for it,  
with explanation 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Others (Please specify):  
Click here to enter text. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
Part 3: Response to Engagement 
 
5. When your company is contacted to discuss ESG issues, which department(s) will be involved? 
You may choose more than one answer. 
 
☐ Corporate social responsibility  ☐ Human resources 
☐ Corporate communications ☐ Finance 
☐ Investor relations ☐ Others (Please specify):  
Click here to enter text. 
 
6. When your company is contacted to discuss ESG issues, which level(s) of management will be 
involved? You may choose more than one answer. 
 
☐ Administrative and/or operational staff 
☐ Middle management reporting to the senior management 
☐ Senior management reporting to the board of directors 
☐ Board of directors 
☐ No managers or directors are typically involved        
☐ Others (Please specify): Click here to enter text.  
 
7. When deciding how to address ESG issues, which criteria would your company consider?  
You may choose more than one answer. 
 
☐ Relevant legal requirement and 
regulations 
☐ Cost implication of necessary measures to 
address the identified ESG issues 
☐ Relevant international norms (soft laws) ☐ Financial return of addressing the identified 
ESG issues 
☐ Standard practice within the domestic 
industry 
☐ Budget availability 
☐ Best practice within the domestic 
industry 
☐ Reputational value of addressing the 
identified ESG issues 
☐ Best practice within the foreign industry ☐ Impact on risk preparedness and 
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management 
☐ Opinion of employees, if applicable ☐ Impact on stock prices 
☐ Opinion of non-governmental 
organisations, if applicable 
☐ Impact on continual investment by 
institutional investors 
☐Others (Please specify): Click here to enter text. 
 
8. If your company decides that the ESG issue(s) raised by the institutional investors or their 
engagement representatives is NOT a material concern, how would your company respond? 
 
☐ Ignore their engagement or further requests 
☐ Reply that the issue is not a material concern, without providing reason or proof 
☐ Reply that the issue is not a material concern, providing reason or proof 
☐ Others (Please specify): Click here to enter text. 
 
9. If your company decides to address certain ESG issue(s), how would your company implement 
the relevant measures? You may choose more than one answer. 
 
☐ Set well-defined goals for the implementation 
☐ Set up a progress-tracking and reporting scheme with measurable indicators 
☐ Hire external professionals and consultancies, if necessary 
☐ Others (Please specify): Click here to enter text. 
 
Part 4: Evaluating Engagement 
 
10. Have engagement efforts by institutional investors or their engagement representatives led to 
any positive change in your company’s ESG-related policies or practices? 
 
☐ Yes 
☐ No (Please go to Question 12 directly) 
 
11. Following Question 10, have such changes had a positive impact on your company’s financial 
results? 
 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
  
12. If your company has addressed certain ESG issue(s) before, due to institutional investors or 
their engagement representatives’ involvement, OR any other factors, what are the impacts of 
your company’s actions? Please skip items that are not applicable to your company. 
 
 Worsen Neutral Improved 
Internal comprehension of ESG issue(s) ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Compliance with relevant regulations ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Compliance with international norms ☐ ☐ ☐ 
ESG performance compared to domestic 
industry 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
ESG performance compared to international 
industry 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
Stakeholder satisfaction (e.g. employee, non-
governmental organisations) 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
Overall operational costs ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Kei Yau Sin, IIIEE, Lund University 
60 
 Worsen Neutral Improved 
Overall financial return ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Company reputation ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Risk preparedness and management ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Stock price ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Interests from institutional investors ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Others (Please specify):  
Click here to enter text. 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
13. On a scale of 1 – 5, please rate how helpful the following practices are, to help your company 
understand the institutional investors or their engagement representatives’ expectation of your 
performance in ESG issues and corporate responsibility. 
 
 Highly 
unhelpful 
Somewhat 
unhelpful 
Neutral Somewhat 
helpful 
Highly 
helpful 
 1 2 3 4 5 
ESG evaluation and screening of your 
company based on publicly available 
information 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Thematic ESG research on an ad hoc or 
regular basis 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
ESG questionnaires to your company ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Reports on ESG rating of your 
company 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Reports on ESG recommendations for 
your company 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Letter from one or more investors 
sharing specific ESG concerns 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Request for proof or documentation on 
the handling of identified ESG issues 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Face-to-face meetings or teleconference 
to discuss ESG issues 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Company or site visits ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Submission of shareholder resolutions ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Proxy voting with explanation ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Collaborative engagement from more 
than one investors 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Divestment with explanation ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Others (Please specify):  
Click here to enter text. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
14. On a scale of 1 – 5, please rate how well your company understand your institutional investors 
or their engagement representatives’ expectation on your performance in the following ESG 
issues:  
 
 Highly 
unclear 
Somewhat 
unclear 
Neutral Somewhat 
clear 
Highly clear 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Environmental risks ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Labour and human rights issues ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Community outreach ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Transparency and reporting ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Corporate governance (e.g. compliance) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
15. On a scale of 1 – 5, please rate how your company prefers the communication channel with 
institutional investors or their engagement representatives. 
 
 Highly  
unfavoured 
Somewhat 
unfavoured 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
favoured 
Highly 
favoured 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Electronic mail ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Postal mail ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Facsimile ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Telephone calls and/or teleconference ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Face-to-face meetings ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Company and/or site visit ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Others (Please specify):  
Click here to enter text. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
16. Please select the top five factors that would best motivate your company to improve your ESG 
performance. 
 
☐ Institutional investors’ expectations on 
ESG issues 
☐ Consumer demand  
☐ Legal regulations ☐ Other stakeholders’ opinion (e.g. employees, 
non-governmental organisations) 
☐ International norms (soft laws) ☐ Financial return of addressing the identified 
ESG issues  
☐ Best practices within domestic industry ☐ Reputational value of addressing the 
identified ESG issues 
☐ Best practices within foreign industry ☐ Others (Please specify):  
Click here to enter text. 
 
Part 5: Other Descriptive Comments 
 
17. If you have other comments regarding ESG-related engagement with institutional investors or 
their engagement representatives, which are not covered by any of the above questions, please 
indicate them below. 
Click here to enter text. 
 
End of Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for your participation. Please save and send the completed questionnaire to 
kei_yau.sin.577@student.lu.se. You will receive a copy of the Informed Consent Form completed by the 
researcher shortly upon your submission. Your company may be contacted by the researcher, Ms. 
Kei Yau Sin, to clarify or provide a more detailed account of the answers, if needed. If you have 
further questions regarding this research, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher at 
kei_yau.sin.577@student.lu.se.  
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Appendix 4: List of Interviews 
For interviews conducted in strict confidentiality, interviewees’ names were replaced by 
abbreviations of their roles, while company or organisation names were replaced by a brief 
description of the organisation. The list is sorted according to the interviewees’ last name or 
abbreviations in alphabetical order. 
No. Date Interviewee* Position 
 
Company/Organisation Location Method 
1 18-04-2013 CGSP Head of Research A corporate governance service 
provider for asset owners and 
managers 
The United 
Kingdom 
Telephone 
2 21-11-2012 & 
02-05-2013 
ESP1 Managing 
Director 
A responsible investment research 
and engagement service provider 
serving global clients 
Denmark Face-to-face 
3 10-04-2013 ESP2 Senior 
Engagement 
Manager 
A responsible investment research 
and engagement service provider 
serving global clients 
Sweden Telephone 
4 22-04-2013 ESP3 Director of ESG 
Research 
A carbon advisory and analytics 
firm serving Australia and the 
Asia-Pacific 
Australia Telephone 
5 29-04-2013 ESP4 Researcher A responsible investment research 
and engagement service provider 
Korea Telephone 
6 30-04-2013 ESP5 Head of ESG 
Research Center 
A think-tank that also provides 
responsible investment research 
and engagement service 
Japan Telephone 
7 02-05-2013 ESP6 Senior Consultant A responsible investment research 
and engagement service provider 
serving global clients 
Denmark Face-to-face 
8 02-05-2013 ESP7 Researcher A consulting firm that also 
provides responsible investment 
research and engagement service 
provider 
China Telephone 
9 24-04-2013 FPRSP Senior Account 
Executive 
A home appliances manufacturer 
and retailer for the Chinese and 
overseas markets; listed in Hong 
Kong 
China Telephone 
10 10-04-2013 IA Principal, Head 
of Asia, 
Responsible 
Investment 
A global investment advisory Australia Telephone 
11 30-04-2013 II1 Analyst Asset manager of responsible 
investment funds 
The United 
Kingdom 
Telephone 
12 02-05-2013 II2 Assistant Analyst Asset manager that specialises in 
investing in Chinese investee 
companies 
China Telephone 
13 16-04-2013 IRO1# Assistant 
Director, 
Corporate 
Communications 
A real estate developer and 
manager in Hong Kong and 
China; listed in Hong Kong 
China Telephone 
14 29-04-2013 IRO2 Assistant General A consumer goods company China Telephone 
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Manager focusing on retail and food and 
beverages in China; listed in Hong 
Kong 
15 09-04-2013 Dr. Liu, 
Baocheng#   
Director Center for International Business 
Ethics, University of International 
Business and Economics 
China Email in 
Chinese 
16 13-04-2013 Liu, 
Weihua# 
Vice Chairman 
and General 
Secretary 
China Committee of Corporate 
Citizenship 
China Email in 
Chinese 
17 16-04-2013 Nielsen, 
Birgitte# 
Head of CSR Investment Fund for Developing 
Countries 
Denmark Telephone 
18 25-04-2013 QM# Director, Quality 
Management 
A manufacturer of polymer 
components for 
telecommunication devices 
China Telephone 
19 02-05-2013 SC# Consultant A global management and 
technology consultancy; listed in 
New York 
Singapore Email 
20 02-05-2013 SM# Global 
Sustainable 
Material Manager 
A global garment manufacturer 
and retailer; listed in Sweden 
China Telephone 
 
*Abbreviations for interviewees: 
CGSP – Corporate governance service provider 
ESP – Engagement service provider representing institutional investors 
FPRSP – Financial public relations service provider representing a Chinese listed company 
II – Institutional investor, including asset owners and/or managers 
IRO – Investor relations officer of a Chinese listed company 
QM – Quality manager 
RIC – Responsible investment consultant 
SC – Sustainability consultant 
SM – Sustainability manager 
 
# Interviewees contacted in the alternative data collection plan 
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Appendix 5: Alternative Interview Questions 
 
Chinese Investee Company 
 Can you briefly describe your company's experience in discussing ESG matters with 
the institutional investors? 
 How well does your company understand the institutional investors' expectation of 
your company's ESG performance? 
 What will help your company better understand the institutional investors' 
expectation of your company's ESG performance? 
 
Academics / Researchers on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in China 
 What changes in CSR disclosure have you observed in Chinese companies in the past 
few years? What areas still need improvement? 
 What do you think are the biggest challenge to further the development of CSR or 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues among Chinese companies? 
 How well do you think Chinese companies understand international norms on CSR 
or ESG issues?  What do you think should be considered when implementing such 
international norms in China so that CSR or ESG development can be promoted? 
 How well do you think Chinese companies understand the concept of “responsible 
investment” and institutional investors’ expectation on their ESG standards? 
 
Chinese branch offices of international companies operating in China 
 Can you briefly describe your company’s strategy on ESG matters? 
 As part of an international company, how does the Chinese branch office implement 
the group-level corporate ESG-related policies in China? 
 Has the Chinese branch office encountered any challenges when implementing the 
group's ESG-related policies in China? How does the office overcome such 
challenges? 
 
Sustainability consultant advising Chinese companies 
 What are the greatest obstacles for Chinese companies to approach or implement 
sustainability or CSR in their operations? 
 From your experience, how well do you think Chinese companies understand 
international sustainability or CSR norms such as the UN Global Compact? How can 
the implementation of such international norms be improved in China? 
 What factors do you think best motivate Chinese companies to implement 
sustainability or CSR in their operations? 
 
 
 
 
